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Chapter I: Introduction 
 
The United States is generally viewed as the global protector of democracy.  
Throughout the nation’s history, there have been many times when the United States pursued 
policies to either protect or promote democratic governments abroad.  Peoples’ freedoms are 
incredibly important to the American1 government, because it preaches equality for all is 
necessary and freedoms allow a government to grow and better develop itself to create better 
lives for their people.  The most important aspect of the American government, however, is 
electing officials that want to represent the people in Congress and as president.  The office 
of the president of the United States is the most crucial position in government because of the 
tasks it is presented with in creating or continuing policy that is best for the nation.  When the 
United States forms policy, the president is the one judged in terms of the public either 
supporting or opposing it.  The president is perceived be the overall representative of the 
people, and therefore he is thought to create policies that represent the American peoples’ 
views.  In this thesis I will be examining foreign policy created under presidents George W. 
Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump and the degree to which public opinion affects it. 
 
Broad Context  
 
The American political world seems to be much different than it has been in previous 
years.  A new style of politics has been introduced; i.e., one that allows the political parties to 
                                                        
1 When I use the word “America” or “American”, it is assumed I am discussing the United States of America, 
and none of the other countries in the American continents. 
  
 
 2 
engage in verbal confrontations with each other to determine who is “right” and who is 
“wrong.”  A new battle has also begun within the media, as there is a new appearance of a 
bias between media outlets.  I began thinking back to previous American responses to 
policies and began to question if there was ever a time in which the American public 
influenced foreign policy actions through the media or if the media just expressed the news 
to the public about what the policies did.  No events in recent years came to mind, and that is 
when I decided to conduct research on determining whether public opinion influenced 
American foreign policy, and what is the media’s possible role in this relationship. 
 
Country Case Selection  
 
Examining the relationship between foreign policy, media coverage, and public 
opinion under all of the American presidents would take years, so it was important to narrow 
down this thesis to a time period, which would then suggest the presidential administrations I 
should study.  I wanted to hold my research to modern events, which is why I am focusing on 
foreign policy under President’s George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump.  Each 
created unique policies that were designed to help the nation in difficult times. Seeing how 
these policies were supported or opposed in the United States may help me understand if the 
public played a role in the policy alteration.  Also, Presidents Obama and Trump created 
some policies that were originally designed and introduced under the Bush administration, so 
there will be an examination on whether or not continued policy received either more support 
or opposition because it was done under either a new president or a different time. 
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I did not want to focus on foreign policy as a whole since that topic is too large to 
discuss within a senior thesis.  Therefore, I concluded that I would focus on one area that has 
been a focal point of presidential foreign policy, the media has covered extensively, and the 
public has had fairly strong opinions on: the Middle East.2  However, I chose three specific 
nations within the Middle Eastern region that have received a large percentage of the 
attention: Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran.  Afghanistan was chosen because it is the focal point 
of the so called “war on terror.”  Military forces have been deployed there regularly since 
military force was authorized in 2001.  The American people have seen fluctuations of 
deployment, withdrawal, successes, and failures within the region, making it an excellent 
choice.  Ideally, we will find that Afghanistan policies fluctuate from administration to 
administration, along with media coverage and public opinion. 
Iraq was chosen for reasons that are similar to Afghanistan’s, but it has faced more 
military action and fluctuation.  There was essentially one military action designated for 
Afghanistan, but Iraq is a nation where the American people experience two separate Iraq 
campaigns: the first in 2003, and again in 2014 during the rising Islamic State of Iraq and 
Syria, or ISIS.  These topics are essential in looking at public opinion on policy because the 
prolonged military presence that was needed to stem the terrorist organization’s rise to 
power.  President Trump won the presidency at a time where ISIS was still a threat, which 
makes each president very involved in a complicated military operation overseas.  As will be 
discussed in the following chapter on Vietnam, the American people are now generally tired 
of long military campaigns, so seeing if this effect remains true and if it affected any part of 
the campaign will be interesting to determine. 
                                                        
2 When I use the phrase “The Middle East,” I am referring to the Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran. 
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Lastly, Iran was the final nation selected for this study because of its rise as a regional 
power and the conflicts the United States has had with it diplomatically.  While it is not 
directly part of the military action against terrorists, it has sponsored terrorism, an aspect the 
United States stands strongly against.  Iran has constantly made attempts to pursue ways to 
acquire a nuclear arsenal, and the United States has been at the forefront in ensuring it does 
not succeed.  Each of the presidents have attempted to strike some type of deal with Iran that 
would stem its enriched uranium grade research.  There have been numerous strategies about 
how to approach these agreements with a variety of media coverage, so seeing how the media 
covered the results of the deals or agreements conducted may prove beneficial in determining 
if there was any type of influence on the public.  Iran is a large, regional power, and because 
it has had the same conflicts with each president, it was deemed crucial to include in this 
thesis. 
 
Research Question 
 
The overall question to this thesis is: To which degree did the media influence the 
American public’s support of or opposition to presidential foreign policy making in the 
Middle East under Presidents George W. Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump?  This 
ambitious question will allow us to better understand the democratic system as a whole and if 
the public actually has influence in a democracy as it believed to be. 
Three hypotheses can be formulated to address the media’s role in foreign policy 
making and on public opinion: (1) the media plays a significant role in the public’s support of 
or opposition to presidential foreign policy; (2) the media does not have much influence on 
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the public’s views of foreign policy; and (3) the government uses the media as a tool to 
demonstrate the benefits of their policies.  Aside from the general hypotheses found in 
scholars’ works, the chapters on Bush, Obama, and Trump will offer their own hypotheses on 
the anticipated influence of public opinion on policy.  However, it is generally hypothesized 
the public will have some degree of influence on the policies American presidents pursue in 
the Middle East. 
 
Literature Review 
 
Discussion about the influence of public opinion on foreign policy has been pervasive 
within the pertinent scholarly literature over time.  Walter Lippmann first addressed this 
relationship in his work in 1921, making bold statements about the public’s function that 
most people today would disagree with.  His work was joined by Gabriel Almond, which 
followed similar trends in stating the public thought is not acknowledged when creating 
policy.  Together, their work is known to state that, generally, the public has little effect on 
presidential foreign policy making.  Their viewpoint was never challenged until Ole R. Holsti 
wrote a piece about how the relationship between foreign policy and public opinion had 
evolved over time.  This literature review will discuss the major contentions in the Almond-
Lippmann consensus and Ole R. Holsti’s critique on how public opinion has evolved over 
time, with a section discussing the relationship between the media, public, and government. 
In general, Almond and Lippmann’s work has three common features that Holsti 
describes as follows: , “(1) it is volatile and thus provides inadequate foundations for stable 
and effective foreign policies; (2) it lacks coherence or structure; but (3) in the final analysis, 
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it has little if any impact on foreign policy” (Holsti 1992, 439).  Lippmann acknowledges that 
public opinion is supposed to be a mover of democracies, that is, public opinion is supposed 
to play a prominent role in the decisions of democratic law makers. However, Lippmann’s 
writing gives the impression that the public is manipulated on election day for politicians to 
win votes, thus making public opinion ineffectual in influencing policy (Lippmann 1921).  
To him, public opinion is a mystery that politicians must decipher in order to win elections.  
The politicians either use public opinion to their advantage, however they ran the risk of 
angering the public in the event bad policy was issued.  Lippmann also believed that the 
public knew little about what was happening in the foreign policy world.  The public had no 
opinion on the matter because it did not understand what went into it (Lippmann 1925).  The 
final point of contention from Lippman’s end was his belief in the idea that public opinion 
was never cohesive.  He saw the public as set of individual actors who decided to stand on 
one end of the support or opposition spectrum, which would never affect any change in 
policy making (Lippmann 1925). 
Almond’s approach to the understanding of public opinion towards foreign policy 
ploughs a different road that leads to the same conclusion.  Ultimately, Almond stated that 
most Americans tend to focus on their private lives and material goods, making them more 
interested in domestic policies and indifferent to foreign policy (Almond 1950).  Disinterest 
in what occurs overseas would make the people’s opinions largely unheard or acknowledged.  
Almond also contributes to the overall arguments through his belief that, “most Americans 
lack intellectual structure and factual content” (Almond 1950, 69).  This is one of the pillars 
of the Almond-Lippmann consensus because a lack of structure could lead to volatile public 
opinion shifts.  Also, lacking structure leads to the public not having a significant base on 
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which to formulate policy opinion.  These contentions give insight into the reasoning that the 
public was generally thought of as not having the capabilities to influence foreign policy. 
Holsti’s first major point of contention challenges the idea of the public having a 
“volatile” mood towards foreign policy.  His research found the public has strong, stable 
reactions towards foreign policy that mimicked the strength in opinions on domestic policy.  
He discovered that the public generally does not receive full information about events, 
treaties, conflicts, and other major issues between nations, but it is still able to think 
rationally about the situation and arrive at conclusions that are drastically different than what 
the Almond-Lippmann consensus believes (Holsti 1992).  These findings allow scholars to 
understand the evolution of public thought on this first point, opening the idea that the public 
is more rational than volatile.  The second major contention of public opinion lacking 
structure and cohesiveness was debated based on the idea of how different political views 
cause political groups to have structure within their own communities.  Holsti acknowledge 
that the scholars to date have not agreed on a broad conclusion on if the American public at 
large was structured, but he nevertheless found certain groups, whether unilateralists or 
multilateralists, were generally well organized in supporting the same ideas.  Therefore, 
while the public may not agree with every view, each organization was cohesive and well-
structured within their own ideologies (Holsti 1992).  The last major contention may be the 
most important, as it addresses whether public opinion actually influences foreign policy.  In 
general, Holsti found more research was needed to reach a conclusion due to similar data on 
both ends of public opinion impacts and public opinion does not impact foreign policy 
spectrum.  There were vast amounts of research that placed data on both sides, with 
politicians either not pursuing policy in the face of public opposition to it or ignoring public 
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opinion entirely (Holsti 1992).  However, despite Holsti’s comments on a divided 
conclusion, it is clear through his studies that public influence has been on the rise in recent 
decades than before and may continue this upward trend. 
This thesis will then contribute to this discussion of whether public opinion impacts 
foreign policy, but it will be adding a new variable.  These original discussions only refer to 
the relationship between foreign policy and public opinion, however, in the modern era, the 
public opinion and foreign policy dynamic has evolved and new variables need to be 
accounted.  The media has risen to a higher standard because of their interactions with 
government officials and talking to the people to learn about their views.  Therefore, in order 
to understand whether a new dynamic is taking form between the public and foreign policy, 
we must introduce the media variable.  Instead of now looking at whether one affects the 
other, the media variable will allow to see if they hold any type of influence on either side, or 
whether they serve as information that allows the people to create their own views on policy. 
Walter Lippmann’s studies on the media were limited to newspapers because of the 
technology of his time.  He mostly wrote on what the news entailed and how the American 
people should perceive it.  Lippmann was of the mindset that although the American public 
expects to hear the truth from media sources, their primary function is record and recognize 
events.  This idea is echoed in his statement on the news as being “precise in proportion to 
the precision with which the event is recorded” (Lippmann 1921, 229).  This precision has 
been challenged for some years, because as more events occur, more facts and information 
are needed for the audience.  Lippmann also reported newspapers need to balance the facts 
with judgments in order to make sense of the variety of facts they possess (Lippmann 1931).  
Lippmann believes the press has power within their field to create their own idea of public 
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opinion.  In this case, an autonomous public opinion would not truly exist, and it would 
potentially give the media large amounts of power if they attempted to change any policies.  
He continues this theory in his mentioning that the news can either help or cause civil unrest 
and disorganization within an institution, which would seem to give it extraordinary degree  
of influence (Lippmann 1921).  While Lippmann mentioned all of the theories surrounding 
the news, his main idea of the press revolves around it not having an effect on the public 
because it merely records events. 
Within the same sphere, Almond believes the media does not have a major impact on 
the relationship between the public and government, but he does acknowledge there has been 
an increase in media impact on the public over the few years when his article was written in 
1956.  The media, according to Almond, does a better job at taking an active role learning 
about and commenting on what foreign policy initiatives are, and while there is no 
mentioning of it affecting the American public’s thought, they desire the news more and 
want to hear more (Almond 1956).  However, Almond gives the impression that the media 
works as an arm of the government based on its transmission of news.  He found the media 
portrays some information based on the overall mood or tone of the subject matter.  If the 
president had grave news, the media will project apprehension and unease, while if the news 
were great, everything would appear uplifting.  While some of the newscast could be 
exaggerated or emphasized, causing the American people to behave more agitated towards 
some stories and less towards others, this only occurs if the news were operating with limited 
information (Almond 1956).  Thus, there is an evolution from Lippmann to Almond, but the 
major agreement between the two is that the media does not have a function in aiding the 
support or opposition of the American public towards foreign policy. 
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Thus, it is clear that while the media may not have a direct effect on public opinion, 
the general consensus is the media’s influence is increasing, and more research needs to be 
conducted in order to better understand the relationship between the public, government, and 
media.  This thesis will contribute to the overall discussion of determining if the media plays 
a role in aiding either the public or government in their creating or changing of foreign 
policy.  The media was recognized to cause the public become more aware of the foreign 
policy changes undergoing (Soroka 2003), yet their impact has yet to be discovered.  
 
Chapter Organization 
 
In order to better understand the current relationship among the government, media, 
and public, it was recognized we must address when relations among them changed.  The 
first chapter discusses the Vietnam War and how it became a turning point in how the public 
thought about foreign policy.  It will be found that the media originally served to help the 
government persuade the American people the former’s policies were good, but that the war 
caused the public to pay more attention to the White House’s actions, and the media changed 
their role and became more critical.  This event became a catalyst for change and served as 
one of the reasons as to why Americans more attentive.  This background allows us to 
understand how the current relationship between the public and government took shape and 
how it has progressed throughout the years.  Every current event has a starting point, and in 
terms of the people becoming more attentive about towards foreign policy, Vietnam was the 
beginning. 
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The following chapter will be fully devoted to President George W. Bush, his policies 
towards Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran, how the media responded to his policies, and what the 
public thought of them.  There will be a demonstration of policies, media coverage3, and use 
of public opinion data to determine if there was any influence towards the policies, as there 
could be correlations between public opinion and policy.  President Bush instituted much of 
the current policy towards dealings with terroristic organizations and foreign adversaries at a 
time when the nation faced a devastating terroristic attack, and it is theorized the public 
supported military action and sanctions the limited nuclear growth, however they grew tired 
of a prolonged presence in a foreign nation, but continued to support limiting nuclear 
advancement.  Thus, the evidence found within the chapter demonstrates that while there was 
a change in opinion on the military actions in the Middle East, a change of policies did not 
follow.  It serves as the first example that living in a democratic nation does not necessarily 
mean decisions are made based on the American public’s beliefs. 
After discussing the Bush presidency, the thesis turns its attention to President 
Obama.  This chapter will follow the same format as the previous one, but there will also be a 
determination on whether Obama continued his predecessor’s policies or if he followed a 
different policy course.  Including a continuation or discontinuation of policy allows us to 
understand if President Obama saw any mistakes within Bush’s approach to policy and either 
tried to fix or merely followed suit.  As Bush was a Republican and Obama a Democrat, it is 
theorized that foreign policies changed, and the public opinion was taken into account to a 
                                                        
3 Typically, in political science we like to avoid biased sources, however we made an exception for the media 
coverage component of the chapters.  It is acknowledged there are times when major media outlets exhibit a 
large bias, but this is beneficial to the information in the chapter.  It is this type of bias I want to examine to 
determine if it would affect the public to react to the foreign policy in anyway.  Therefore, all three chapters 
contain opinion pieces that are designed to reflect what the public believes. 
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greater degree.  To complete this process, we will again examine how the media portrayed 
his policies and what the American people thought of them.  Public opinion polls will be 
used to determine if public opinion fell in line with policy, included with a discussion on 
whether the media influenced either side or if they served as information on foreign policy 
for public knowledge.  Based on this information, will we discover President Obama’s 
presidency largely mimicked Bush’s, and public opinion did not necessarily affect the course 
of foreign policy.  President Obama is often viewed as someone who was an advocate for the 
people, and while his decisions on which foreign policies to pursue in the Middle East 
correlated with the thoughts of American public opinion, the American people did not 
recognize that. 
  The final chapter that will provide evidence that American public opinion not 
affecting foreign policy making in the Middle East will be devoted to sitting President 
Donald Trump.  While only a little over two years into his presidency, it is crucial to use 
Trump’s presidency as a key in order to predict whether or not we will eventually see the 
same trends as the previous presidents.  Thus, I included the major policies he has 
implemented to date, keeping in mind that some of those policies are fairly new and are in 
formation.  The media coverage was fairly difficult to investigate, because for this thesis the 
main focus is the coverage of the policies and not the person making them.  In researching 
this topic, I discovered that many news sources were more focused on Trump’s rhetoric and 
personal actions rather than his policies, so it became important that every source was 
thoroughly screened in order to find the pertinent information.  I will also be using public 
opinion polling data to determine if public opinion correlated with the course of Trump’s 
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policies.  Overall, this chapter will show that there is a major disjuncture between all three 
fields, which each changing courses and opinions as a result of introduced policy. 
Lastly, this thesis will conclude by explaining how all three of presidencies ultimately 
cause us to realize public opinion does not ultimately influence foreign policy decisions with 
regard to the Middle East.  Each chapter will be summarized, but with a focus on how to 
better understand their findings and what they might mean going forward.  However, there 
will be another aspect included in the conclusion, and that will be a discussion on whether 
there is a public partisan divide between supporting or opposing policy.  Partisanship within 
the public opinion sphere is incredibly important upon looking into the deeper reasonings of 
policy support, which is why it must be included.  This thesis only focuses on the American 
general public to understand if similar policies under different presidents’ garner more, less, 
or the same support among the public, however, the question of whether public partisanship 
plays a role within foreign policy support is a subfield of my research, which is why it will be 
discussed in the concluding chapter. 
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Chapter II: Vietnam as a Turning Point 
 
The discussion of when the American public began influencing foreign policy must 
be addressed in order to accurately portray the overall effects they have had.  Thus, this 
chapter will serve as a brief history of when the American public began impacting the 
government’s foreign policy beginning at the Vietnam War.  In modern day, the Vietnam 
War has been generally discussed as being incredibly influential on the government because 
of its importance in the world of the 1960s.  It will be found that the war served as a catalyst 
in the changing relationship between the public and the government, with the media causing 
much of the change.  First there will be a presentation on how the government and media 
worked together in terms of showing war, followed by the support of the war, which 
ultimately had a steady decrease in opposition, in which the recognized year of culminating 
events is 1968.  The final section of this chapter will discuss the roll this war played, and the 
limitations presidents now have on prolonged external conflicts. 
Upon looking at the great history of the 1960s, it would be wrong to discount any 
other outside factors that may have contributed to the overall lack of public sentiment 
towards the war and furthered general public involvement in foreign policy.  Thus, it is 
recognized that outspoken leaders such as Martin Luther King Jr., and actions such as the 
institution of the draft, which was incredibly unfavored by college students, will not be 
discounted.  These factors may have contributed, but this argument relates the media as the 
main reason of these three that led to the downfall of the Vietnam War and increased public 
involvement in support of foreign policy. 
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Historical Relationship Between Media and Government 
 
The relationship between the media and government is something that should never 
be overlooked.  Naturally the two fields have never had the same relationship as today, but 
seeing how they have progressed gives background on the general whys and hows the 
dynamic has changed.  This section will serve as the general overview between the media 
and government have communicated in order to portray similar information, keeping the 
public’s faith in the military. 
Originally, newspapers and letters were the original method of learning about battle 
outcomes and casualty numbers, but as the times progressed so did the news.  The Civil War 
was considered by many to be the first modern war that incorporated many photographs from 
the aftermath of the battle, and found the first time newspapers had the ability to mass 
produce the corresponding battles either the next day or within a week (“News and the Civil 
War · The News Media and the Making of America, 1730-1865” n.d.).  The same could be 
said about World War I.  World War II, however, is where the American public saw the 
biggest shift in how they received their information.  This time brought about a change, for as 
the technology advanced so did news distribution.  In order to ensure the American people 
had any type of validated information on the world war, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt 
created the Office of War Information, or OWI, through executive order 9182 on June 13, 
1942 (P. W. Stewart 2016). 
The American people would attend cinemas to see governmental films on the war, 
and the OWI controlled all of the vetted information.  The different companies that worked 
for the OWI system, called “United News,” were permitted to send two civilian camera 
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crews to heavy combat areas to capture images.  The footage would then be sent to the War 
Department, which was tasked with reviewing what type of images would be permitted and 
what would be censored (P. W. Stewart 2016).  The editing could take weeks, even months, 
to complete, so many times the public was watching old footage that did not properly dictate 
where in the war the military stood.  Aside from those government run films, citizens would 
also watch Hollywood films that depicted some type of war story.  These movies were also 
created through famous producers, such as Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer (Koppes and Black 1977).  
While there were issues with the type of content Hollywood could show, the underlying fact 
is during World War II the government had a monopoly on any type of war imaging and 
discussion in cinemas and on the radio, thus creating a clear form of manipulation that 
showed the American people the brighter side of the war compared to the mass casualties in 
both theaters of operation. 
However, the Vietnam War brought about a new type of media portrayal that changed 
how the news function upon dealing with the government’s interpretation of the war events.  
Vietnam became known as the first televised war, because it allowed the American people to 
see the events unfold in front of them, unedited, as it truly happened (Mandelbaum 1982).  
The American people were no longer subjected the manipulation of the government, but now 
shown what the mass media believed was more accurate. 
 
Public’s Feelings Up To 1968 
 
It is no secret that the Vietnam War was known for its unpopularity in the 20th 
century.  The 1960s in general is a decade when most Americans learn about the struggles 
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the United States was facing both internationally and domestically.  Therefore, instead of 
learning about the war as a whole, people tend to focus on the vast amount of student 
demonstrations and disparaging media coverage.  However, people generally forget the 
widespread support for the war prior to 1968.  Even though modern day views the war 
negatively, it does not represent the entirety of the public’s feelings about it.  Therefore, it is 
important than when we address the Vietnam War, we take the time to study not only the 
latter half but also the earlier portions of it to see how the public supported military actions.  
Then, we can move on and see how exactly the public influenced the foreign policy towards 
Vietnam over the years due to an increased unpopular view. 
Public support on Vietnam is very difficult to track within the first few years of the 
war because it was not very public to the American people.  Presidents Dwight D. 
Eisenhower and John F. Kennedy began the military involvement on the Vietnamese 
Peninsula through the deployment of American troops from 1955 to 1963.  Originally, the 
people knew of some type of involvement and inclusion of military advisors and small 
portion of troops, but it was not until roughly 200,000 troops were sent under President 
Lyndon B. Johnson to Vietnam in 1965 did the people begin to formulate ideas on American 
involvement (Lunch and Sperlich 1979).  Previously, after Kennedy’s assassination in 1963, 
the American people knew so little about the war efforts that Secretary of Defense Robert 
McNamara advised Johnson to sparsely acknowledge Vietnam to the public, even though 
there was a subtle increase in more military and economic resources (Sobel 2001).  As the 
escalation  against North Vietnam and the National Liberation Front increased, so did the 
public’s interest, causing a desire for more information on the war efforts (Sobel 2001; 
Lunch and Sperlich 1979).  However,  1967 still found a majority of the American public 
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favored the increasing military efforts (Appleton 1966; Lunch and Sperlich 1979; Sobel 
2001). 
Johnson used the uninformed public to his advantage as he deployed more troops 
every year.  This escalation, documented in the Pentagon Papers, found the President called 
up an extra 262,000 men to prepare for military action along with an extension of a terms of 
service, keeping those serving for longer (Gelb 1971).  This 1965 recommendation increase 
troops in Vietnam to over five-hundred thousand.  Despite the American people technically 
having the majority of support of the escalation, it was found that this began the slow trend in 
increasing opposition towards Johnson and the war efforts. 
The support garnished under Johnson’s administration demonstrated the public 
preferred policies that sought a quick military victory, but it was believed the public wanted 
to limit American involvement in Vietnam (Appleton 1966).  Ultimately, there was a divide 
between policy makers, in which those whose favored the war became known as “hawks”, 
and those opposing the war “doves.”  This rift may have started the preliminary feelings of 
uneasiness towards the war.  Unfortunately, there was no bridge linking these two ideas, and 
a divide furthered between the “doves” and “hawks.”  These sides also caused a rift between 
what opinions were heard.  In the early 1960s, “hawks” were more likely to have the support 
of the elites, while the “doves” were only represented through opinion polls (Berinsky 2004).  
However, in the opening decade of the war, the public was more likely to support the 
“hawks” ideas towards the war.  In a 1966 Gallup poll, seen in Figure 2.01, 47% of American 
adults sided with the “hawks” while only 26% with the “doves” (Saad 2016).  However, the 
doves’ voices were echoed more after a change in elite opinion.  This information implies 
opinions were generated around and tended to follow elite thinking. 
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[Insert Figure 2.01] 
 
The Change in Public Opinion: February 1968 
 
In a poll that tracked public opinion on determining whether or not Vietnam as a 
mistake, according to Figure 2.02, the beginning of September 1965 and end of February 
1968 found overall support that it was not a mistake to enter Vietnam, as seen in Figure 2.02 
(Sobel 2001).  However, favorability gradually changed from support to withdrawal.  While 
it was noted that the public would believe and support President Johnson’s decisions if the 
public believed it represented their concerns (Appleton 1966), that view ultimately 
disappeared, and anti-war sentiments slowly emerged.  The second half of the Vietnam War 
brought about a type of resistance to foreign policy the United States government never 
witnessed before.  This resistance resulted in eleven different protests across college 
campuses between 1965 and 1970 (Giugni, McAdam, and Tilly 1999).  The protests did not 
cease there, however, and continued for several more years until the war officially ended on 
April 30, 1975, when North Vietnamese tanks entered the Saigon Presidential Palace 
(“Milestones: 1969–1976 - Office of the Historian” n.d.). 
 
[Insert Figure 2.02] 
 
To the American government, the sudden outrage that erupted across the nation 
seemed random.  However, that was not entirely the case.  Upon looking closer at Figure 
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2.02, one can see the slow regression the public had on their opinions, showing an increase in 
opposition.  Very slowly, starting as far back as 1965, there have been records of college 
campuses protesting.  Beginning in 1965, professors at colleges and universities would have 
a “teach-in”, which would prompt students to discuss and resist the Vietnam War (Sobel 
2001).  These small anti-war expressions slowly crept around the United States for several 
years before any other type of resistance arose.  The year 1967 saw mass demonstrations in 
New York City and San Francisco, afterwards prompting President Johnson to acknowledge 
something must be done to keep the public on his side (Sobel 2001). 
Unfortunately for the president, a large military event occurred that secured the 
demise of American support on the war.  The Tet Offensive, carried out early in 1968, 
sparked new feelings among the American people because of what the government stated.  
Originally the government and major news networks would televise how successful the 
American troops have been and how weak the North Vietnamese were, but when Viet Cong 
guerillas and the North Vietnamese army spontaneously attacked Saigon and other American 
military bases, the people began to question that reliability.  Tet ultimately ended in an 
American military victory, as the Viet Cong were routed, but that did not matter to the 
general public (“U.S. Involvement in the Vietnam War: The Tet Offensive, 1968” n.d.).  The 
public was focused on how a supposedly weak enemy could launch an offensive that almost 
ended the war. 
In what defined the legacy of the Vietnam War, American college students began to 
openly resist the war in a variety of ways.  As time in the war increased, so did the students’ 
opposition.  They would march at rallies or burn their draft cards in solidarity to show their 
staunch unwillingness to fight to the government.  At times, the protests were so large and 
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potentially dangerous the national guard was deployed to prevent any type of harmful action, 
however that approach had consequences.  In 1970, the national guard was deployed to a 
Kent State University student protest.  Because of nervousness about the size of the protest, 
the guardsmen opened fire on the students, killing four (Lewis and Hensley 1998).  The 
protest’s impact was so large that it caused more campuses to have similar events.  Even 
though there was already a constant and consistent decrease in support, events such as the 
Kent State shooting prompted more outbreaks that ensured the government knew the opinion 
of the people.  The next three years brought about further protests, and the American people 
split into either support or opposition to the war.  Their collective voices reached the ears of 
Congress, convincing many policymakers that the war was not worth the costs. 
 
Media’s Impact on the Vietnam War 
 
As previously discussed, the Vietnam War was known as the first televised war.  
Originally, much of the early footage shown on televisions in the early 1960s were replicas 
of the upbeat, winning the war type info as shown during World War II (Hallin n.d.).  This 
was largely due to the fact that television networks were wary in presenting any type of 
graphic imaging.  Some of their footage included combat, however this was mainly of 
marines shooting into the woods at an unseen foe (Mandelbaum 1982).  This allowed for the 
governmental films and edits to remain the primary source of information.  However, this all 
gradually changed as the course of the war continued.  As to be discussed in this section, 
there were several key outbreaks that prompted major news networks to bypass governmental 
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filters and instead project their own interpretation of events, aiding the shift in public opinion 
towards the war. 
There were certain events that contributed to the downfall of the war that could be the 
cause of the mass media.  One of the first instances, which ended in the absolute destruction 
of a village, Cam Ne, was aired without any type of governmental editing.  In 1965, a CBS 
news team, headed by anchorman Walter Cronkite and correspondent Morley Safer, 
witnessed an incident where United States marines unnecessarily burned a town to the literal 
ground.  This town, Cam Ne, had no involvement in the war, but after Cronkite and his 
fellow CBS correspondents were fired upon during a visit, the marines then burned 
everything (Brinkley 2012).  Safer caught the events on camera and immediately sent it to the 
main headquarters in New York where it was aired that night.  The White House wanted 
CBS correspondent Safer fired for filming this act because it brought about negative opinions 
towards the military, but the news station kept him because it showed the public what was 
actually happening (Brinkley 2012). 
Three years later, 1968 saw three major events that ultimately ensured the public 
opposition for the war would fall.  In February, Cronkite voiced his own opinion of what the 
outcome of the war will bring in his national broadcast titled “Report from Vietnam, Who, 
What, When, Where, and Why?” (Brinkley 2012, 369).  During the broadcast, Cronkite 
stated “For it seems now more certain than ever that the bloody experience of Vietnam is to 
end in a stalemate” (Brinkley 2012, 378).  Afterwards, President Johnson knew that his 
public support for the war was officially over and announced he would not run for re-
election.  However, the biggest reaction the president had was when he stated, “If I’ve lost 
Cronkite, I’ve lost middle America” (Carlson and Berkowitz 2012, 417).  The greatest 
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importance of this statement is clear submission of a United States President to that of a news 
source.  Before this event, the nation never saw a president succumb to popular opinion, 
much less a news source, and fully admit that they could no longer have support because one 
event.  By not fighting Cronkite and declaring his statement as incorrect, Johnson gave up 
and admitted the war could not be won.  
The second event in 1968 was Vietnamese Colonel Nguyen Ngoc Loan’s execution 
of a Viet Cong guerilla in the middle of the street after the Tet Offensive (Hallin n.d.).  This 
iconic photo, taken by Associated Press photographer Eddie Adams, was displaced across 
countless newspapers including the New York Times and Associated Press (Astor 2018).  
The impact this particular photograph had was incredible, because it showed the brutality of 
the war.  Here, an unarmed, handcuffed Viet Cong guerilla was executed swiftly.  According 
to the rules of the Geneva Convention, an execution can only be carried out through a death 
sentence via court (Red Cross, n.d.).  Therefore, upon the notice and recognition that Loan 
only approached the captive and executed him, there is a clear violation of the convention, 
which showed the American people the sheer brutality of war that was occurring.  This photo 
only empowered the war opposition movement. 
Only a month later in March, United States Army troops committed one of the 
greatest, and most infamous, massacres at My Lai, furthering Johnson’s War as bad press, a 
wrong decision, and the war’s overall brutishness.  Military personnel entered My Lai on a 
peaceful March day, yet the days end found countless civilian casualties.  Ordered to the 
surrounding area because of a report stated there was a strong Viet Cong presence was there, 
the soldiers ended up murdering over 500 innocent men, women, and children (History.com 
Editors 2009).  While the news networks did not explicitly witness these events, a soldier 
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who was present did not participate, leaked the story to the press, which then covered the 
court martials of the men in command (PBS n.d.).  After the news investigation was complete 
and the photographs taken by Sergeant Ronald Haeberle surfaced, the public reacted 
negatively and continued their opposition.  Once this barbarous act was aired on television 
and read about in newspapers, the American people kept their strong opinions about ending 
American involvement in the war. 
 
[Insert Figure 2.03] 
 
One chart that helps demonstrate the severe trend of opposition is Figure 2.03.  This 
chart graphs the confidence in military leaders over time as well as the public’s view on 
whether Vietnam was a mistake.  As one can see, there are gradual trends in the military 
leaders’ confidence decreasing and the view of Vietnam as a mistake increasing, with these 
points intersecting at 1968.  Upon the noticing this intersection, it is noted that the public and 
military leaders had the same general feelings that only decreased steadily, but more rapidly, 
as the war continued.  Upon the events that secured the downfall of the war, nothing could 
have been done that would alter the military or public opinion.  For both, the war was over. 
 Overall, the media was incredibly active in the capturing of Vietnam footage.  Their 
desire to extract accurate information for their viewers greatly conflicted with the 
government’s intention on maintaining domestic support.  Therefore, it is found that many 
major declines in support are relative to some of the major events that occurred.  Scholar 
John E. Mueller analyzed and tested the Gallup data shown in Figure 2.02 with his own 
collected data in order to see the natural progression.  What he found, shown in Figure 2.04, 
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is the steady continuation of public opposition that swept the nation (Mueller 1971).  Another 
aspect the chart shows in the two major drops that occurred in the post-Tet period, supporting 
the idea that the culminating events of 1968 were the final events needed to secure the notion 
that the war will not regain popularity. 
 
[Insert Figure 2.04] 
 
Consequences of the Vietnam War 
 
The Vietnam War has left a legacy that was riddled with negativity.  It existed in a 
world that was creating ways to produce information that was not subjected to a 
governmental filter.  The major news networks now worked for themselves, gathering 
information to accurately inform the citizens of the real events that were unfolding.  The time 
for governmental manipulation was over.  Thus, the Vietnam War left several legacies, some 
that have continued to modern day, and some that ended at the end of the century.  This 
section dives into two of the consequences and how they relate to today’s society with the 
public’s observance of foreign policy. 
The first consequence was the origination of the Vietnam Syndrome.  This feature 
stated that the United States will never enter a war without a clear objective, sufficient 
military force, and an overall, combined support of both Congress and the American public 
(Kalb 2001).  No scholars are certain where this originated from, but its overall effect 
constrained presidents in pursuing prolonged conflict.  Generally, the media has been 
attributed with causing much of the syndrome aspects, such as demonstrating public support 
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and providing the nation with the government’s objective, thus promoting the idea that the 
media had a large say in determining support or opposition for a military action.  However, 
the Syndrome ended in 1991 with a victory during the Gulf War.  The media played a large 
role in praising the military, which was heavily financed and prepared for a quick victory 
(Sobel 2001).  President George H. W. Bush calculated all of his moves to ensure that the 
public would support him if he did in fact order an invasion.  Therefore, upon having the 
approval of Congress, the public, and with good media showing, the Gulf War was highly 
successful (Sobel 2001).  After this war, the United States was at ease with the Vietnam 
Syndrome, as the US military had a successful invasion. 
The second major consequence that resulted from the Vietnam War is how Vietnam 
overall served a critical juncture of the relationship between public opinion and foreign 
policy.  As seen throughout this chapter, the American public originally went from a 
misinformed, not caring nation to a fully invested, oppose the war reaction.  This twenty-year 
war brought about a new type of attention to foreign policy that never addressed earlier.  
Because of how the media was able to bring raw content to American homes, the people 
found it easier to have an opinion on the type of content they were being shown.  Also, the 
steady decline in favorability towards this war was the first time it was seen, and well 
documented, in the history of United States military actions.  While they were some 
unpopular wars in the past, the Vietnam War paved the way for the American people to 
speak out and protest decisions they did not favor.  The consequence of this juncture has 
extended to modern day, where the public has a seemingly similar response to the policies 
that have been implemented in the Middle East. 
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Chapter III: President Bush 
 
Nearly thirty years after the Vietnam War, a tragic event struck the heart of the 
United States.  On September 11, 2001, terrorists associated with the group known as al 
Qaeda hijacked four airplanes and flew them into the World Trade Center in New York City 
and the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia.  The September 11 attacks thrusted the United 
States into new types of policies the nation had never before adopted.  This chapter will 
discuss the policies the Bush administration pursued in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran, how the 
media covered these events, and public opinion on these policies.  It will argue that public 
opinion did not affect any presidential foreign policy decisions, and that the media supported 
the policies until the military campaigns continued for a prolonged period.  Media coverage 
on Iran was shallow because of the public’s disinterest. 
 
Policy Initiatives in the Middle East 
 
President Bush initiated the policies with which most Americans are now familiar 
when dealing with terroristic organizations.  The September 11 attacks created a new world 
for the presidential administration that did not involve waging conflict against traditional 
nation states, but rather invisible organizations stretched across multiple countries.  Overall, 
Bush’s policies were largely structured on combatting terror organizations within 
Afghanistan and fighting or limiting nuclear growth in Iraq and Iran.  This was the first time 
in many years since the United States was last attacked at home, which is why the policies 
were very militarily involved.  The goal in defeating terrorism and limiting an adversaries’ 
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nuclear growth was designed to protect the American people.  The policies Bush pursued in 
Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran will be respectively expanded upon below. 
 
Afghanistan 
 
Contrary to what the American people believe, the United States has not technically 
been at “war” with terrorism.  The phrase “war on terror” was derived from President Bush 
during his address to the nation following the September 11 attacks.  During this address, the 
president stated: “We will stand together to win the war against terrorism” (Bush, n.d.), 
thus introducing this concept to the American people.  Since then, US involvement in the 
Middle East has constantly and consistently been referred to as either the “war on terror” or 
“global war on terror.”  The truth behind what would become one of the longest “wars” the 
United States has conducted was technically a simple authorization of military force.  The 
joint-session resolution in no way declares war against global terrorists, but rather states: 
 
That the President is authorized to use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, 
organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist 
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in 
order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such 
nations, organizations or persons (Public Law 107-40 2001) 
 
This distinction is incredibly important because it allows us to understand the United States 
Afghanistan invasion policy at the basic level.  It is first crucial to understand that it was 
technically not war.  For the remainder of the thesis, I will use the phrase “authorization of 
force” to refer to the United States war on terror. 
The authorization of force is the first policy President Bush introduced towards the 
Middle East following the September 11 attacks.  Ultimately, it allowed for a reallocation of 
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military resources to the Middle East in an effort to prevent more terror attacks on the 
American homeland.  Stopping foreign terrorism became the priority for the Bush 
administration because of his passion for protecting the American people.  This is noted in 
his speeches, for he always emphasized his willingness and determination to do everything 
necessary to protect the American people.  One statement that echoed this devotion came 
from his address to a joint-session of Congress, in which he stated: “I will not yield; I will 
not rest; I will not relent in waging this struggle of freedom and security for the American 
people” (Bush, n.d., 73).  The invasion of Afghanistan lasted three months, but the 
determination of protecting the people from terrorism spread to Iraq (“A Timeline of the U.S. 
War in Afghanistan” n.d.).  However, President Bush was not ceasing his efforts in 
Afghanistan to help the nation rebuild itself from Taliban control. 
The second major policy effort that was conducted after the United States military 
invasion was pumping funds into Afghanistan to rebuild their nation.  While there are 
different theories on the motives behind this funding, ultimately President Bush pursued a 
policy in which he was determined to create a democratic government within the turmoil of 
the failed Taliban state.  Originally, the Taliban instituted dangerous reforms and laws for the 
people who were constantly at risk of punishments for not behaving like a Muslim should in 
the eyes of the Taliban (Laub 2014).  Building a democratic institution that was close to 
mirroring the American system was thought to be a more stable way of creating freedoms for 
the Afghan people.  However, the Taliban was never fully expelled from Afghanistan, as 
military operations continued throughout the Bush presidency, and many regions were still 
subjected to Taliban influence and governance (“A Timeline of the U.S. War in Afghanistan” 
n.d.).  Creating a government that could successfully repel the Taliban would have also 
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allowed the American military and advisors to leave.  Thus, President Bush pursued a policy 
of aid that would allow the United Nations to help rebuild the nation. 
The invasion of Afghanistan to overthrow the Taliban regime and the restricting of 
the Afghan government were the two policies that served as an umbrella for the future 
presidents.  More military action was taken throughout the presidency on perceived Taliban 
hideouts, and aid was distributed throughout different sections within the government 
(Suhrke 2011).  The goal in Afghanistan was to create a make shift democracy that would 
allow for the people to have the same freedoms and liberties as American citizens 
experience.  However, Bush only began the restructuring of Afghanistan.  Most of the 
president’s attention turned to Iraq, leading a majority of time ensuring the Taliban did not 
successfully regain control of Afghanistan.  
 
Iraq 
 
The most prominent policy the Bush administration instituted in Iraq became known 
as the Bush Doctrine.  It had four parts that were the backbone of what the Bush 
administration believed: 1) the internal actions of a state drove the external actions; 2) 
preventive war; 3) unilateralism; and 4) the United States must serve as a hegemonic power 
(Jervis 2003).  These four aspects not only drove the American political engine as it worked 
to dismantle the Iraqi dictatorship, but also served as the major factors driving American 
involvement during their occupation.  The Bush administration believed that the internal 
actions of a government reflected their foreign policy; or believing a tyrannical government 
would pursue tyrannical foreign policy.  Thus, as Iraq was a major power in the Middle East 
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and served as a mentor to others in the region, it was concluded that there should be an 
attempt to create a democracy within Iraq for two reasons (Jervis 2003).  The first was to 
show the world that the United States was determined to see the abolition of tyranny.  
Second, President Bush saw the resolution of the Iraq conflict as a first step to creating a 
more peaceful world.  If there was one thing about which Bush was most passionate, it was 
taking the measures needed to promote freedom and peace throughout the world (Jervis 
2003). 
The second pillar was a willingness to engage in preventive war if the situation 
deemed necessary.  Preventive war is attacking a nation before it has the opportunity to strike 
the United States or its allies (Gregg II 2016).  With regard to Iraq, the goal was to eradicate 
terrorism and the assumed weapons of mass destruction.  Using this type of preemptive 
attack is risky, as with Iraq it was unclear whether or not the nation had nuclear weapons, and 
even if it did, whether it would actually use them (Jervis 2003).  Therefore, as a protective 
means, and still very wary of Middle Eastern nations because of the September 11 attacks, 
the invasion of Iraq continued on the grounds of preventive war.  The third pillar is often the 
most contested of the Bush Doctrine, as it is purely unilateralism in regard to worldly 
dealings.  While the United States’ intentions were clear, another aspect of this policy 
demonstrated to the world that there was one plan of action that would be followed: the 
American plan.  There was the overall consensus within the Bush administration that this 
authorization of force and, ultimately, the global war on terror would be led by the might of 
the American military, and no country or international organization could deter it (Jervis 
2003). 
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The last pillar is American hegemony.  This idea is not merely just a policy, but also 
serves as more of an idea.  It is described as the United States, being the greatest power, must 
act differently than other nations that are not as powerful.  In one sense, it seems as if the 
United States is now taking a position of becoming so powerful that it would be impossible 
for other nations to come close to rivaling it, especially with regard to its nuclear capabilities 
(Jervis 2003).  It seems logical for the greatest power to have the most lethal arsenal, yet 
relatively dangerous at the same time.  However, when it came to operationalize this idea in 
Iraq, the American power showed itself not only through quick military victory, but also the 
power it had over the country during its occupation.  As a result of “winning,” the American 
government found itself occupying Iraq, dictating its new, governmental future.  American 
hegemony is more than just the projection of military power, it involves controlling the 
nation and the gears within it. 
The second policy instituted in Iraq was the effort to stabilize the nation.  Once the 
United States overthrew the regime, it was now tasked with the challenge of replacing it.  An 
interim government was formed, and steps were taken to create a democracy.  The technical 
occupation of Iraq ended June 28, 2004, however numerous American soldiers still remained 
within the country in order to help the Iraqis safeguard the stability of their new government 
(“George W. Bush - Key Events” 2016).  Due to Iraq’s ethnic and religious diversity, the 
goal was to create a government that would be able to incorporate all people without leaving 
one susceptible to unfairness by the others.  While it was unclear at the time how long the 
process would take, it was incredibly important Iraq transitioned to democracy because of its 
centrality for Middle Eastern politics. 
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Iran 
 
The United States relationship with Iran during the Bush administration began 
relatively well, with the former helping American efforts in rebuilding the Afghanistan 
government post invasion.  The relation was so strong in building an Afghan government 
Iran persuaded many Afghanis to back Hamid Karzai, the American selection for president 
(Hadley n.d.).  However, Iran was known for its attempts of creating and refining weapons 
grade uranium in their search to build a nuclear weapon and also its training and funding of 
Islamic militants throughout the Middle East.  President Bush decided to not engage Iran 
militarily as he did in Afghanistan and Iraq and decided to impose sanctions upon and create 
deals in order to combat their nuclear pursuance.  Ultimately, Bush these sanctions and deals 
that were designed to circumscribe both the Iranian enrichment program and the country’s 
support of terrorism throughout the region. 
One of the major policy initiatives Bush pursued towards Iran was pressing for a 
nuclear deal that would incorporate and allow the United Nations and the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, or IAEA, to review their nuclear plants and determine if their 
nuclear program was in fact creating nuclear power for the citizens and not for weapons 
(Hadley n.d.).  This agreement was constructed to give the IAEA better access to Iranian 
black sites that were supposedly used and designed for researching and developing weapons 
grade uranium for nuclear weapons.  Originally some of the first rounds of negotiations 
failed, which prompted harder stances to be taken.  Ultimately, the Bush administration, with 
help from the United Nations, applied sanctions on those partaking in nuclear pursuance and 
froze the assets of those who helped arm the Iranians (Hadley n.d.).  However, the United 
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States applied additional sanctions against the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corp and state-
owned banks.  This action was close to a frontal attack against the Iranian government, as it 
limited the Iranian government’s control on their own citizens (Hadley n.d.). 
The nuclear policy Bush pursued with Iran pertained to the latter’s involvement in 
promoting state-sponsored terrorism.  Iran was widely known to be among the main 
supporters of the terrorist organization Hezbollah, which is one of the greatest threats to 
Israel, a key American ally.  It was believed Iran’s support of terrorism was a means of 
rejecting Bush’s sanctions (Byman 2006).  However, Bush made it clear he would not 
tolerate nations that sponsored terrorism.  Not engaging Iran militarily, as he did in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, because of their involvement with terrorism demonstrated a new style 
of approaching nations sponsoring terroristic organizations.  Iran was included in the 
administration’s global “war on terror” because of their support of Hezbollah, however their 
approach to restraining that involvement varied from previous policy. 
 
Media Impact 
 
The beginning of the “war on terror” was unique, largely because no one knew what 
the future held.  The government, citizens, and media were now wading through unchartered 
waters, unsure about what next to expect.  The media covered the ‘war’ as they saw it, 
showing the American people what was occurring overseas.  They proved to be the primary 
source of information for the public, letting them know how the policies were enacted and 
the success they yielded.  This section will seek to understand the media’s role and determine 
  
 
 35 
if it may have played a role in altering public opinion or served as means of obtaining 
information. 
 
Afghanistan 
 
The invasion of Afghanistan received widespread attention from the media because of 
the 9/11 attacks.  Day after day, the media portrayed images and videos of planes striking the 
towers, the civilians on the street running from the horrors, and people jumping out of the 
World Trade Center as an alternative to burning.  Therefore, when it came time for Bush to 
declare his authorization of force, the media greatly promoted the announcement, helping stir 
the public into supporting  a foreign war (Kellner 2004).  It is surprising at how quickly the 
news media reacted to the terrorist attacks and how determined they were to endorse 
retaliatory military action.  Some outlets created their own slogans calling for wars, and 
others calling for large, immediate action designed to quickly defeat the terrorists (Kellner 
2004).  Another story that prompted the media’s support for the military action occurred 
when the White House released a statement how the invasion of Afghanistan was also 
designed to help Afghani women (Berry 2003).  The media used the women’s plight as a 
means of covering the actual conflict that was occurring in Afghanistan.  They manipulated 
the people in supporting the effort because one of the primary focuses was protecting women 
(Korn 2011). 
However, despite the extensive coverage supporting military action in Afghanistan, 
the news coverage largely faded.  Towards the tail end of Bush’s presidency, the Middle 
Eastern focus was primarily on Iraq.  This shift began after the initial Iraq invasion largely 
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because of the belief that Iraq captivated reporters.  There were more combat, troops, and 
general action, which is why larger news outlets sent more reporters there (Korn 2011).  
There was also the thought that Afghanistan in general had complicated motivations, 
dangerous terrain and areas for reporters, and was too expensive to cover effectively.  Even 
still, it was generally hard for the media to exhibit the events in Afghanistan because the 
public had primarily turned its attention to Iraq (Folkenflik 2009). 
 
Iraq 
 
As we saw briefly above, media coverage of Iraq steadily increased after the 2003 
invasion.  Ultimately, it was resulted in most outlets validating military action.  Various news 
sources agreed with Bush’s statements concerning Iraq’s nuclear weapons without 
investigating their veracity (Kurtz 2013; The Daily Take Team 2013).  Iraq became 
incredibly popular, and the thought of overthrowing a dictator who had nuclear weapons 
brought the Americans together.  The media never bothered to investigate the claims made 
because they did not think to do so.  The outlets were subjected to groupthink and never 
wanted to worry about any other opinions opposing the invasion (Kurtz 2013).  However, 
coverage did change as the years wore on. 
After the negativity began, the Bush administration became worried about the press 
only underscoring “bad news” (O’Hanlon 2006).  The thought that continued showing of 
violence and destruction overseas would cause the public to develop negative views arose 
within the administration (O’Hanlon 2006).  In the latter years of the Bush presidency, the 
media spent a lot of time covering Iraq because of the number of military actions taking 
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place.  Iraq was seen as more important that Afghanistan, and many outlets relocated some 
Afghanistan reporters to Iraq (Folkenflik 2009).  Most of the coverage shifted to violence, the 
exorbitant cost of the action, and disagreements among different Iraqi leaders, which 
demonstrated rifts within their government what their plan following the conclusion of 
military action (O’Hanlon 2006).  Therefore, while the media originally supported military 
action, it gradually shifted its views after the elongated campaign began having more 
negative than positive results. 
 
Iran 
 
Media coverage of Bush’s Iran dealings was scant.  This demonstrates that while 
Bush may have made it a priority in limiting Iran’s nuclear ambitions, the media was too 
involved with other events.  However, based on some of the media outlets that spoke of 
Bush’s pursuit of an Iran deal, the sources were neither supportive nor critical, they simply 
informed the general public of what was occurring.  PBS covered a fair portion of Bush’s 
Iran relationship, offering  details on what was attempted, background information on Iran, 
how they affected the United States, and explained certain sanctions (Hadley 2010).  The 
reasons as to why there was a general lack of media coverage undoubtedly include as the 
media’s preoccupation with Iraq, a factor that will be discussed in the concluding section of 
this chapter. 
 
Public Opinion 
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Determining how public opinion affected Bush’s policies is important because it may 
serve as the beginning of a trend in the public’s influence on foreign policy.  The public 
began the war with Bush, and after seeing the media’s coverage of it, it is theorized the 
public was largely supportive of the initial invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq.  The people 
were angry about the September 11 attacks and wanted to respond, which is why I am 
theorizing overwhelming support at the beginning of the presidency.  However, it is also 
expected to see a shift in how the public reacted as the war continued, for as we learned 
about Vietnam, support waned with prolonged military presence.  It is theorized the public 
would largely support the deals with Iran, as they would prefer to see sanctions placed on an 
adversary who was bent on acquiring nuclear weapons. 
 
Afghanistan 
 
[Insert Figure 3.01] 
 
[Insert Figure 3.02] 
 
In the first figure CBS News asked respondents whether they approved or disproved 
of military action in Afghanistan in October 2001 and between September 19 and 23, 2009.  
The 2001 chart, labeled as Figure 3.01, noticed that overall, 90% of respondents supported 
military action in Afghanistan, while only 6 percent disapproved, and 4 percent did not know 
(De Pinto 2009).  When contrasted with the September 2009 chart, labeled Figure 3.02, we 
see a very clear drop in approval and rise in public disapproval.  At the end of the Bush 
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presidency, 47% of respondents approved of the military action in Afghanistan, 42% 
disapproved, and 11% did not know (De Pinto 2009). 
 
[Insert Figure 3.03] 
 
Another figure that demonstrates public attitudes towards the affairs in Afghanistan 
was conducted by Gallup, which also found a steady decline in support over time.  Figure 
3.03 observes whether Americans viewed sending troops to Afghanistan as a mistake, and in 
2002 a vast majority, 89%, declared it was not a mistake.  However, as the years and issues 
progressed, 2009 saw 66% believing it was not a mistake (Newport 2014).  This drop is not 
as significant as the one CBS discovered, however the relationship between the two cannot 
be ignored.  Even though this graph expands to 2014, for now the focus is only on the Bush 
administration from 2002 to 2009. 
However, perhaps the most revealing graph does not come from American public 
opinion, but Afghani opinion.  While this thesis focuses on American support or opposition 
for Bush policies, the results of a poll on Afghani opinion of the United States from 2005 to 
2009 shows very similar regressions as that of the previous graphs.  Titled Figure 3.04, in 
2005, 83% of Afghan citizens were incredibly favorable of the United States.  However, 
2009 saw a decrease in that favorability, as 47% of the citizens now saw the United States as 
favorable (Langer 2009). 
 
[Insert Figure 3.04] 
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Iraq 
 
[Insert Figure 3.05] 
 
[Insert Figure 3.06] 
 
The first two figures, Figures 3.05 and 3.06 respectively, derive  from a Pew Research 
Center study that asked American citizens two questions: if the decision to use military force 
in Iraq was a right or wrong decision; and if troops should pull out or stay in until the nation 
was stabilized (Editors of Pew Research Center 2008).  This study spanned from the invasion 
in 2003 to the end of the presidency in 2008, and despite seeing a downward trend similar to 
Afghanistan, Iraq experienced a significant drop in favoritism incredibly quickly.  Initially 
citizens supported the military as both the right decision and remaining until Iraq was 
stabilized, but the quick loss of support beginning roughly around 2005 causes researchers to 
question if there was an event that triggered a drastic change from support to opposition in 
Iraq. 
The next figure was taken from a Gallup study that was solely designed to study 
American public opinion on Iraq.  It asked different questions on multiple fronts, however 
the most important was their tally on if the American people viewed Iraq as a mistake.  As 
can be seen from the data in Figure 3.07, the results are the same as that of the Pew studies.  
The trends follow the same downward slope that appears to intersect early in the Iraq 
campaign.  When comparing it to the Afghanistan figures, the difference is very clear: Iraq 
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faced more unfavorability from the American people than Afghanistan.  Gallup also shows 
that there is a strong opinion that the United States should not have entered Iraq. 
 
[Insert Figure 3.07] 
 
[Insert Figure 3.08] 
 
The final public opinion chart was taken from a CBS study that asked respondents 
whether they believed the Iraq War was worth the costs, first in 2003 and again in 2008.  
Figure 3.08 has the results from the data CBS collected, with only 46% of respondents 
believing Iraq was worth it in 2003.  While the tally drops off  in 2008, with only 28% 
believing the war was worth the costs, the overall regression remains stagnant with all three 
polling sources (Dutton et al. 2014).  Thus, the polls continued to find, across different 
surveys and agencies, that the general public had the largely same opinions on the Iraq War.  
The only stark difference between the CBS polls and Pew and Gallup is their close margin in 
2003.  Where the previous polls saw a great rift between opinion at the start of the campaign 
in 2003, the CBS poll found respondents were never positive about the military engagement 
at all. 
 
Iran 
 
Similar to the media information, there was also a lack of polling data for Bush’s Iran 
policy.  There is some data that portray how the American public felt about Iran as nation.  
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Figure 3.09 demonstrates that the American people did not have a favorable view of Iran for 
the entirety of Bush’s presidency.  Following the trend from 2001 to 2008, 80% of 
Americans on average stated they viewed Iran unfavorably (Gallup Inc n.d.).  If 80% of 
Americans had this view, one would assume there would be more polling on Bush’s dealings 
with Iran.  Gallup also found that in 2006, another 80% of their respondents believed Iran 
was creating their own nuclear weapons based on what they heard from the government 
(Gallup Inc n.d.).  Again, 80% is a supermajority, yet Iran never seemed to take any type of 
spotlight within the foreign policy world in the media.  However, based on the policy Bush 
pursued, it could be assumed he was following the public’s preference in attempting to limit 
Iran’s nuclear ambitions. 
 
[Insert Figure 3.09] 
 
Conclusion 
 
The information presented in this chapter demonstrates certain transition periods that 
occurred during the Bush administration.  For Afghanistan and Iraq, both the media and 
public supported the military campaigns designed to counter those who committed the 
September 11 attacks.  However, as time progressed, both the media and the public grew 
tired of military actions, and negative views slowly increased.  In general, Afghanistan was 
largely more favored than Iraq because of the direct relationship the former had to the 9/11 
attacks, as the graphs demonstrated a large majority viewed a military campaign in 
Afghanistan was the correct course of action until the Bush presidency ended.  The only 
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astonishing realization occurred when the lack of coverage began because of the new mission 
in Iraq.  This fact was never considered in an original hypothesis because it never seemed 
plausible.  At the time, it was well known that the terrorists arrived from Afghanistan, yet a 
nation that had no affiliation to al Qaeda received more troops and combat.  Afghanistan 
faded from the media’s spotlight and only resurfaced during Obama’s presidency. 
Iraq saw the distinct shift from support to opposition from both the media and public, 
as was apparent through discoveries of the media broadly showing negative effects of the 
“war” and the drastic change in opinion over the years.  Nevertheless, the media could be 
partially blamed for misleading the public into supporting the war because it largely failed to 
scrutinize the main arguments Bush presented to justify his decision to invade the nation.  
Despite the original backing of the policy, the media realized the harsh realities of combat 
and strove to contain mostly negative press, which accounted for the concern within the Bush 
administration that the media would cause them to lose the “war.”  Overall, the military 
action continued despite failing public and media support. 
As previously mentioned, Iran never had any type of real spotlight in the media’s 
foreign policy news.  A deal was attempted but never consummated, however the post-
Obama deal caused news organizations to argue it was this initial push for a deal in 2006 that 
brought about the Iran nuclear deal (Beauchamp 2015).  It is puzzling as to why Iran was not 
covered more, and it could be theorized that the Iraq coverage happened to overshadow Iran 
as well as Afghanistan.  This theory could stand because the Iraq “war” distracted the media 
from conducting operations within the nation that caused the authorization of military force.  
Thus, it could be theorized that while the public was wary of Iran and Afghanistan, the media 
decided to not cover the policies, leading to limited polling data conducted on those nations. 
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After noticing the media and public’s response in the different nations, we must now 
address the overall effect the media and public had on foreign policy.  Ultimately, the media 
largely served as a means of bolstering public support for Bush’s foreign policy.  While there 
was negative coverage and press, this does not outweigh the large call to arms the media 
promoted in Afghanistan and Iraq after September 11, 2001.  Iran’s media coverage does not 
affect the overall coverage during Bush because the press barely covered the issues 
associated with the nation.  The public did not affect any of the foreign policies because they 
supported the original policies President Bush created.  When the public began expressing 
opposition to his policies, Bush did not alter any of them, which is why they had no effect. 
There is one main reason as to why the public and media strongly supported the 
initial invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq: the rally around the flag effect.  Often associated 
with the Iraq War, this effect emphasizes that the American people strongly supported 
President Bush in a time of national tragedy and crisis (Lindsay 2003).  The public wanted to 
respond because they were directly attacked and may have felt as if they had a duty to protect 
their liberties and have revenge for all the innocent deaths.  However, according to the 
opinion data, the effect was fairly short-lived, as public support for the conflicts drastically 
decreased. 
Researchers also could never have predicted the events that occurred following the 
invasion and overthrowing of Saddam Hussein’s Iraq government.  Ultimately, a power 
vacuum consumed the nation, with multiple factions fighting for control.  This led to the rise 
in the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria, which ended up prolonging the American presence in 
Iraq for years to come.  Researchers tend to blame the initial American invasion for this 
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catastrophe, as it caused presidents Obama and Trump a new type of military campaign to 
confront upon their ascension into office.  
Despite these effects, it will be interesting to see if this trend continues over the 
course of the next two presidencies, or if they will yield vastly different results.  
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Chapter IV: President Obama 
 
President Barack Obama assumed office at a very difficult time.  The previous 
administration left behind a very stressful situation in the Middle East, as Obama was tasked 
with maintaining stability in both Afghanistan and Iraq and the decision about whether to 
continue the previous administration’s policies or develop his own.  This chapter will analyze 
Obama’s policies in Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran and assess whether the American public 
supported or opposed his policies, and whether or not the media influenced its views.  
Overall, it finds that President Obama’s policies were similar to that of Bush’s, they were 
merely implemented in different countries.  Also, similar to President Bush, it finds that the 
media had a generally negative impact on the public support for policies, yet it did not affect 
any of Obama’s policies. 
 
Policy Initiatives in the Middle East 
 
The general policies President Obama pursued varied from one country to the next in 
the Middle East.  However, in retrospect, it is clear that they followed a similar path: limit 
American involvement in conflict zones and protect America’s allies.  The president did not 
favor an American military presence in the region because of its unpopularity in the previous 
administration and made it clear that he would withdraw the troops as quickly as possible.  
Obama also wanted to create stable governments, largely in Afghanistan and Iraq, so he 
promised more funding to those nations as a means of ensuring their governments were 
strong and protected from potential terrorist threats.  Lastly, President Obama was wary of 
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the nuclear developments occurring in the Middle East, and so he desired new policies and 
reforms that would bring about a deal to ensure no nuclear weapons would be pursued, which 
would cost more division and power struggles within the region.  Below, we will discuss 
these policies in detail, first beginning with Afghanistan, followed by Iraq and Iran 
respectively. 
 
Afghanistan 
 
Much of President Obama’s focus in the Middle East was about stabilizing and 
restructuring the new government of Afghanistan.  For comparison, President Bush’s Iraq 
was President Obama’s Afghanistan.  Each had their own goals and beliefs about what 
should be done in a specific country and each devoted considerable effort and time in 
attempting to create their vision.  However, President Bush left Obama with a difficult 
situation to address, as Afghanistan was facing financial difficulties and still at risk of 
persistent Taliban attacks.  The country was crumbling under the weight of lack of stability to 
maintain any sort of survival, and the people were still at risk of Taliban retaking the nation.  
Therefore, in order to ensure the Afghan regime would not crumble during his presidency, 
and after a lot time and money were spent restructuring the nation’s governmental 
organization, President Obama instituted policies in Afghanistan similar to Bush’s Iraq. 
First, Afghanistan was the main target because the Authorization of the Use of 
Military Force dictated that any organization or nation that played any type of role in 9/11 
attacks was subject to American military involvement.  Therefore, Obama deployed 21,000 
additional troops to Afghanistan to ensure neither al Qaeda nor the Taliban retook power 
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(Nelson 2016).  However, despite dispatching these troops, it was recognized there should be 
a new course of action that would allow the Afghani people to defeat the Taliban on their 
own and establish their own form of democratic government.  Thus, similar to Bush’s Iraq 
policy, Obama authorized a surge of soldiers deployed to Afghanistan, above that of the 
original 21,000 there, that were meant to train the Afghan military to be able to defeat the 
Taliban themselves (Nelson 2016).  This surge skyrocketed American military presence in 
the nation, which also gave the impression that maybe the original work of Bush did not 
actually complete the mission.  One issue that also arose out of this policy was the promise 
President Obama made in regard to withdrawing the military from the Middle Eastern region.  
Obama created the idea a stronger military presence was needed to train the Afghanis to fight 
so the United States could finally leave.  The President did keep his promise and began the 
withdrawal of American forces in 2011 (“A Timeline of the U.S. War in Afghanistan” n.d.).  
Even though the American military never fully left Afghanistan under his administration, this 
act potentially demonstrated his policy was successful so there was less need for an 
American military presence. 
The area where the initial policy differed from the previous administration was the 
pursuance of more multilateralism compared to unilateralism.  The Obama administration 
was highly pro-internationalist, emphasizing the need and involvement of international 
organizations along with nations.  Therefore, in order to have a more stable nation, Obama 
pushed the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to assist in the building of non-military assets, 
such as security and police forces, to which NATO supplied roughly 5000 troops (“A 
Timeline of the U.S. War in Afghanistan” n.d.).  Along with that promise was the overall 
agreement among NATO countries that Afghanistan would be fully returned to the people’s 
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rule at the end of 2014 (“A Timeline of the U.S. War in Afghanistan” n.d.).  More funds were 
also distributed to the Afghani government, despite wariness of the nation’s leader, Hamid 
Karzai.  Unfortunately for the lawmakers, they had no choice but to send those funds and 
hope they were being allocated properly. 
The funding was one of the “smaller”4 policies Obama implemented along with the 
overall withdrawal was an aid package that culminated to $1 billion a year to assist Afghani 
civilians, beginning in 2009, and lasting for the duration of his presidency (Miller 2016).  
This was a continuation of the aid programs President Bush formed and was done because of 
the amount of help the nation needed in forming their own government and was separate 
from the other international funds Afghanistan was receiving.  These funds were designed to 
fight corruption and help the nation grow, but there was no way to track where exactly the 
funds were going, thus causing distrust of the government.  In fact, so much aid was sent to 
Afghanistan that 90% of their annual income was foreign aid (Suhrke 2011).  Ultimately, 
much of these funds contributed to political corruption within the government (Suhrke 2011).  
As Obama’s presidency came to a close, the situation in Afghanistan did not improve as the 
government was not stable, and the Taliban were still very prevalent. 
 
Iraq 
 
The case of Iraq was far more complicated than that of Afghanistan.  Initially, Obama 
wanted all of the military troops out of the country as soon as possible, but subsequent events 
complicated thwarted that goal.  When the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) entered the 
                                                        
4 Smaller is in quotations not because the monetary value of $1 billion a year is small, but because it is a 
relatively small policy to pursue and implement amidst the crisis occurring. 
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world stage, the American military could not withdraw, and Obama found himself in another 
conflict.  The brutality in which ISIS ruled over their territory was unprecedented and caused 
global outrage.  While there will be no discussion of any military raids in Iraq, as they do not 
pertain to this thesis, much of the discussion around Iraq involves the challenges Obama 
faced in Iraq as a result of the entrance of ISIS. 
From the beginning of his presidency, Obama wanted to exit Iraq as quickly as 
possible and focus on Afghanistan, as he believed Afghanistan was the focal point of 
terrorism, (Traub 2016).  Thus, 2011 saw a large American withdrawal, which left the new 
Iraqi government largely to defend itself.  Unfortunately, the Iraq War caused a large power 
vacuum in the nation, allowing for any type of person or military group the possibility of 
assuming power.  One of those groups, whose roots traced back to a member in the 
Mujahedeen in Afghanistan during the Soviet Union invasion of 1979, successfully invaded 
Iraq and established a new caliphate (Vox 2015).  Most people in the United States are 
incredibly familiar ISIS, largely because of how quickly they rose.  With a new enemy in a 
nation that was seemingly rescued from the horrors of the last ruler, it appeared action had to 
be taken. 
Thus, ISIS’s rise in Iraq caused the Obama administration to rethink its strategy of 
complete military withdrawal from the country.  When the terrorist organization finally 
became known as ISIS after their invasion of Iraq in 2013, more military force was deemed 
necessary to combat the threat.  In 2015, Obama attempted to receive a separate 
Authorization for Use of Military Force specifically for ISIS.  Originally, ISIS was aligned 
with al Qaeda, which is why the President was technically able to continue using military 
force.  However, when al Qaeda denounced ISIS and stated the two were no longer affiliated 
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with it, the legality of the situation changed and further legal action was needed to continue 
the airstrikes on ISIS targets (CNN Library 2019; Acosta and Diamond 2015; Vox 2015).  
While no authorization was officially passed, it did not deter the American government from 
pursuing military action, including air strikes and special forces raids, on apparent ISIS 
hideouts, as Congress never objected to any of these actions.  Therefore, while the Obama 
administration succeeded in removing ground forces from Iraq, there was essentially a 
resumption of military force in the area due to the new threat, making it appear as if little had 
changed between the Bush and Obama administrations. 
 
Iran 
 
One of the most impactful nations within the Obama foreign policy agenda was Iran.  
Their ambitious pursuit of nuclear weapons continued into his administration, sparking 
international concern.  In the Middle Eastern region, Iran was a dominant force that aspired 
to become a nuclear power.  Thus, they began creating their own nuclear programs in order 
to create something they were always denied.  The Obama administration spent much of their 
time working to constrain Iraq’s nuclear ambitions.  Thus, much of its policy towards Iran 
involved finding ways of limiting the type of nuclear growth they were allowed along with 
restrictions on how many nuclear plants they were allowed. 
Talks about a nuclear deal began in 2013, but as these complex reforms take time, the 
deal was not consummated until 2015.  The deal primary focused around enriched uranium, 
the total amount, and its use.  Enriched uranium is used for a variety of reasons, including 
electricity, but largely nuclear weapons (World Nuclear Association 2017).  Thus, there were 
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suspicions that the Iranian government was hiding their nuclear weapons project within their 
nuclear energy plants.  Also, the Obama administration wanted to limit the amount of 
enriched uranium Iran could have, because it is very difficult to track not only the amount of 
uranium they are currently using, but also what exactly they are using it for. 
The details of the nuclear deal were as follows: Iran’s stockpile of uranium was 
reduced by 98%, and within the remaining 2 percent, only around 3.5 percent was allowed to 
be enriched (BBC News 2018).  Iran also had to turn some of their nuclear weapon plants 
into standard plants that was not capable of producing any type of weapons.  They were also 
tasked with allowing inspections from the International Atomic Energy Agency and 
demonstrating that were not pursuing nuclear weapons in private (BBC News 2018).  There 
were some benefits to Iran so things were not entirely unfair, and those mainly concerned the 
lifting of previous sanctions that had  prevented it from selling commodities like oil, and 
unfreezing its foreign-based  assets so it could trade internationally (BBC News 2018). 
There was a sense of urgency upon creating this deal with Iran because of its negative 
history with the United States.  Iran was very anti-Israel, and as Israel is one of the United 
States’ closest allies, there was worry a nuclear war would break out between the two.  Also, 
as mentioned in the last chapter, Iran was known for being a state sponsor of terrorism.  
Thus, having a country that was willing to export weapons to aid terrorism could alter the 
power dynamic within the Middle East.  Obtaining nuclear weapons could potentially open 
up the possibility for terrorist organizations to acquire them, shifting the type of damage they 
could inflict, the power the organization has within the state, and also wariness in talks in 
attempt to learn their what their demands are and why.  Therefore, obtaining a nuclear deal 
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that would inhibit Iran’s progress was paramount, and the Obama administration greatly 
succeeded in this policy. 
 
Media Impact 
 
The Obama administration received a lot of press coverage because of the public’s 
interest in his response to events occurring in the Middle East and how his policies would 
differ, or be similar to, those of Bush’s.  Naturally there was both good and bad press, but it 
interesting to see the type of coverage media outlets portrayed.  The American public was 
beginning to tire of the war that was progressing into the ten-year period (Stelter 2010), and 
the media coverage of the events may echo those feeling. 
 
Afghanistan 
 
In the early years of the Obama presidency, the news coverage on Afghanistan was 
mostly negative because of the length of time American troops had been deployed there.  
Some of the large media outlets held special reports titled, “Afghanistan: Can We Win?”, 
“Can This War be Won?”, and “Why Are We in Afghanistan?” (Stelter 2010, B1).  These 
special reports aired in the early years expressed the media’s opinion on the military presence 
and policies involving Afghanistan.  As some of these reports were aired on ABC or CBS, 
many people tuned in and may have agreed with the opinions the media portrayed.  This 
negative news coverage of the military action in Afghanistan echoed the public’s opinions. 
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There was a lot of frustration expressed across all media venues that emphasized the 
importance of withdrawing the troops.  MSNBC news anchor Rachel Maddow had a 
primetime program where she stated the following, “Does the president care that the public is 
almost uniformly in favor of getting U.S. troops out and fast? Those numbers are much 
higher than they once were. But he’s not changing his plan. Does he care about public 
opinion on this? And if he doesn’t, why doesn’t he?” (Pew Research Center 2011).  On the 
other side of the political spectrum, Bill O’Reilly opined that “the apathy of the American 
people about the theater [in Afghanistan], it’s almost like Iraq. They don’t want to hear about 
it anymore” (Pew Research Center 2011).  These statements, spoken in 2011, the year of the 
beginning of the withdrawal policy, illustrate generally what the news media thought of the 
policies.  There appeared to be a new understanding between the relationship between the 
government and the news, as the majority opinions of the American people were echoed in 
the broadcast media, stating they were together on an issue and questioning why action was 
not taken sooner or quicker. 
However, there was also more positive news coverage that emphasized President 
Obama was doing a great job in his policies in Afghanistan.  Much of the public understood 
and knew from his stances that Obama supported aiding Afghanistan in their struggle to have 
a sovereign nation, yet he desired a limited role for the United States military.  The media 
assured the public an American withdrawal in Afghanistan was occurring, per their desires, 
even though it was moving slower than desired.  Announcements of the withdrawal were 
made at a time when the public needed to hear good news, because the people could have 
been doubting whether the presidency is making decisions that represents what the people 
  
 
 55 
want.  Following through with the withdrawal demonstrated the administration is in fact 
doing what it said it would (Pew Research Center 2011).  
 
Iraq 
 
Similar to Afghanistan, the American people were supportive of withdrawing from 
Iraq during the beginning of the administration.  There was an overall support for this notion 
because of similar reasons as well.  The length of the military action was exhausting the 
American people, so it came as no surprise when the media reported roughly 75% of 
Americans were pro-withdrawal two months before the last soldier left Iraq (Gustafson 
2017).  Aside from those brief statements, the media barely covered Iraq because the 
occupation was winding down. 
However, one event that cast the conflict in Iraq in a negative light after military 
action resumed occurred when a United States Army Captain sued President Obama for 
waging an illegal war against ISIS.  This case argued the president lacked the necessary 
authorization from Congress to conduct military actions against the Islamic State (Savage 
2016b).  Ultimately the case was thrown out because the judge ruled the Captain lacked the 
standing to sue and the action was matter between the executive and legislative branches, 
therefore making it something the court could not decide (Savage 2016a).  In this particular 
instance, the media was stating what the events were and what occurring.  While it is possible 
this story may have negatively impacted the public’s opinions on remaining militarily 
involved in Iraq, there is no data to support this claim. 
  
 
 56 
Much of the other media information on ISIS largely served as information on what 
the terrorist organization was doing.  Naturally the organization was casted in a negative 
light, as their harsh treatment of citizens was emphasized, which may have caused animosity 
within the public mind. 
 
Iran 
 
At the time of the structuring and agreement of the Iran nuclear deal, the President 
received a fair amount of positive press and congratulations for circumscribing the country’s 
pursuit of nuclear weapons.  However, more recently, stories on the benefits and realities of 
the nuclear deal have surfaced, largely when President Trump decided to withdraw from the 
deal.5  Overall, the news media was torn between support and opposition to the nuclear deal, 
demonstrating a bias between different outlets.  CNN reported the deal to be a success, 
whereas US News stated the deal was a betrayal to the Bush administration’s stance on not 
allowing Iran to own a nuclear weapon, and arguing the deal was a threat to Israel (Glaser 
and Logan 2015; Zuckerman 2015).  There was also the discussion from the sources that 
Obama lied about what the contents of the deal contained, such as giving Iran access to the 
United States financial system when he told Congress that was not a part of the deal (Bacon 
2018).  Even still, there are an equal number of sources that praise the deal for stemming 
Iran’s nuclear growth.  Therefore, the only conclusion within this policy is a divided media. 
The interesting aspect behind the media coverage was the demonstration of bias on 
Obama’s policies.  A divided media could potentially lead to a divided public, which will be 
                                                        
5 This point will be discussed further in the chapter on President Trump.  It was mentioned here as a reference to 
when the media decided to focus on the large pros and cons of the deal as a result of Trump’s challenging it. 
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determined in the following section.  Originally, it was believed and theorized the public 
would have largely supported policy that was designed to prevent a potential adversary from 
obtaining nuclear weapons to either sell to other nations or use for themselves.  Since the 
current challenge to the deal President Trump created, more negative media have arisen.  
However, at the time of the policy enactment, the media remained divided on its success. 
 
Public Opinion 
 
As the ten-year mark of military involvement drew closer, there are certain trends that 
are expected to be seen among the views of the public.  Based on what scholars know of the 
history of the American people during wartime, it is theorized that we are nearing the point in 
which we will most likely find American citizens opposing the war based on the overall 
length and lack of any real result, similar to the Vietnam War, as discussed in Chapter II.  I 
am theorizing this effect will be seen in both Afghanistan and Iraq, as the conflict was in 
those nations the longest.  For Iran, it is hypothesized that the American people supported the 
Iran deal because of the limitations it placed on a nation pursuing nuclear weapons. 6 
 
Afghanistan 
 
                                                        
6 It is recognized that there will be several figures that contain both national average data and data on party 
thought.  For this thesis, the reader should be reminded that we are only examining the general public thought 
on the matter, and ask they refrain from making any assumptions on partisan votes.  As a further reminder, there 
will be a brief section in the conclusion that discusses the possibility of partisan voting shifts, but thesis is 
focused purely on the general public and the effect on foreign policy.  
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Overall, the public opinion about Afghanistan was fairly negative.  While a majority 
of Americans believed invading Afghanistan in 2001 was the right decision (Newport 2014), 
the thought on whether it was appropriate for the military to still be there was vastly 
different.  Figure 4.01 shows the trajectory of American public opinion from 2009 to 2018 on 
two scores.  First, there is the prediction of the effect the United States would have in the 
region followed by the thoughts on how the home nation actually performed.  According to 
the graph, and only focusing on the timeframe of the Obama administration, the end of 2011 
found 58% of Americans believed that the United States would succeed and 34% foresaw 
failure.  Four years later, we see a complete shift between the views that are nearly identical.  
Roughly 36% believed the United States mostly succeeded while 56% believed it mostly 
failed (Oliphant 2018b).  The American people were originally supportive of the 
administration’s decisions, however time showed that war weariness overtook the people and 
there was a strong urge to withdraw. 
 
[Insert Figure 4.01] 
 
The next set of figures focus on the withdrawal plan President Obama implemented in 
2011.  Figure 4.02 asks the general question about whether the American people supported 
the overall plan to withdraw troops from Afghanistan.  As it was found, 72% supported the 
plan, 23% opposed it, and 5 percent expressed no opinion (Saad 2011).  The question in 
Figure 4.03 asked more specifically asked about the timetable that the Obama administration 
introduced and polled the American people on the time it would take for a full withdrawal.  
Overall, as seen from the national average, 30% agreed with the timetable, 33% preferred a 
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shorter timetable, 31% would rather have had no timetable, and 7 percent had no opinion 
(Saad 2011).  While the public appeared evenly split on the length of the withdrawal they 
would prefer, the overarching theme is the policy reflected the polling data on withdrawal, 
and the timetable guided the American people that any type of withdrawal was acceptable. 
 
[Insert Figure 4.02] 
 
[Insert Figure 4.03] 
 
Iraq 
 
[Insert Figure 4.04] 
 
 Even though a majority of Americans still held a very unfavorable view towards Iraq 
during the Obama presidency, as shown in Figure 4.04, much of the American population 
still did not want to be a part of any type of conflict in the region.  Even in 2015, Gallup 
asked American citizens if they would support ground troops in Iraq to help fight the Islamic 
State, 53% were opposed (Gallup Inc n.d.).  This data demonstrates the American thought 
process at the time in the Obama years and the type of policies they wanted to see.  However, 
Figure 4.05 represents a discrepancy between those who favored the full withdrawal at the 
time versus looking back at the policy.  In 2011, 75% of Americans supported the withdrawal 
from Iraq, but only three years later 61% agreed that military troops should have been 
withdrawn (Dugan 2014).  The decline in withdrawal support may have been as a result from 
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the rise in ISIS in Iraq.  People may have wanted the American military involved in order to 
suppress their rise. 
 
[Insert Figure 4.05] 
 
In Figure 4.06, which shows American predictions to the outcomes in Iraq, the 
American people were more confident in the policy working and having success in Iraq than 
experiencing failure.  The middle of 2010 saw 58% of Americans stating there will be 
success with only 35% predicting failure (Drake 2014), which also demonstrated a 
confidence in the White House’s foreign policy.  However, opinions about whether or not the 
United States succeeded or failed is also demonstrated, and 2012 to 2014 mark a clear 
separation between the ideas.  Initially, the public believed that the United States succeeded 
in Iraq by a margin similar to that of those who predicted success over failure.  However, 
2013 saw an even margin of success to failure, and the data for 2014 demonstrates that, 
overall, the United States policy in Iraq had failed (Drake 2014).  Even as the conflict with 
the Islamic State progressed, 58% of the American people disapproved of Obama’s policies 
in dealing with the new terrorist organization (Bowman 2016).  As mentioned above, there 
are some theories that will be discussed as to why this is the case in Iraq. 
 
[Insert Figure 4.06] 
 
Iran 
 
  
 
 61 
Iran has always been a country of which the American public has been wary.  Upon 
calculating Gallup data concerning whether the American public view Iran as either 
favorably or unfavorably over the course of the Obama presidency, an average of 84% of 
American citizens viewed Iran unfavorably (Gallup Inc n.d.).  Figure 4.07 demonstrates this 
trend.  However, in the context of Iran’s long history of sponsoring terrorism beyond its 
borders, it is unsurprising that its unfavorability with Americans has been as high as it is. 
 
[Insert Figure 4.07] 
 
[Insert Figure 4.08] 
 
Looking at the data on the Iran nuclear deal in 2015, as predicted, the time found an 
overall support for the deal, as demonstrated in Figure 4.08.  The study found 56% supported 
the deal with 19% showing disapproval (McCarthy 2017).  The important thing to note at this 
point with the Iranian deal is the continued emphasis on then politics of present day.  The 
people viewed the deal as important to policy because of the limitations it placed on the 
Iranian government in producing nuclear weapons that could potentially damage allies, if not 
the United States, severely. 
However, there is one study that echoes the divided views seen within the media.  
Pew Research Center conducted survey to document American public support for the nuclear 
when it announced and several weeks after.  Their results, shown in Figure 4.09, demonstrate 
a decline from 33% in support to 21% in support for the Iran nuclear deal from July to 
September (Pew Research Center 2015).  This trend is seen in the media as well, as there was 
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a continued division between those who favored the deal compared to those who did not.  We 
also found more opinion pieces in newspapers, such as New York Times, that were written in 
opposition.  Therefore, the media echoes public opinion on this policy. 
 
[Insert Figure 4.09] 
 
Conclusion 
 
Based on the policy information presented in this chapter, it was found that President 
Obama actually pursued similar policies to that of President Bush.  Obama’s surge of 
military troops in Afghanistan echoed that of his predecessor in Iraq, with both showing only 
frustration of failure.  Afghanistan, being the main target during the administration, 
experienced criticism from the American people and media because of the length of the 
operation and lack of progress.  The Taliban were not fully ousted from the country and a 
stable Afghani government was never created even though there was a reallocation of funds 
and personnel to help with those two problem areas.  However, we do find a correlation 
between withdrawal, media coverage of the withdrawal, and public pushing of this policy.  
President Obama stated his goal was to withdraw troops after their mission was completed, 
but there never any indication about exactly when that would be.  In this situation, the media 
may not have directly affected the people’s opinions on the matter, but it helped reflect 
dominant popular thinking. 
There were exaggerations found within the examination, and that was news anchor 
Rachel Maddow’s statement of the “uniform” decision the citizens made.  First, there has 
  
 
 63 
never been one decision the entire public could back.  This word choice was purely designed 
to convey human emotion, not demonstrate cohesion among citizens.  Second, there was no 
real evidence stating the desire for withdrawal was any higher in 2011 than other years.  
While the public became more supportive of the US military mission leaving Afghanistan, 
there was no way to fully track how much its support varied over time.  Much of the opinion 
on the withdrawal policy was not the withdrawal itself, but the time it would take to fully 
leave.  Because the nation was nearly split evenly on the timetable, it was very much open 
for the president to determine which length was better for the troops and Afghan citizens.  It 
was known that realistically an immediate extraction could never occur, so the removal of 
soldiers over time was designed to slowly give the Afghan military control of the operations 
and the government full control over the nation. 
Also reflecting Bush’s policies, as Bush spent little time in Afghanistan, Obama did 
the same in Iraq up until the ISIS invasion, which prompted for a change in policy course as 
the United States was once again needed to intervene militarily.  However, it is also where 
we find interesting effects of public opinion’s impact due to the rise of the Islamic State.  The 
data showed a change of American citizens feeling success but then failure from 2012 to 
2014, and that could be as a result of this rise.  When examining these effects, it is important 
to remember the mission.  The overall mission in Iraq, from the beginning, was to overthrow 
the Hussein dictatorship and establish a functioning democratic government.  However, 
because the situation was treated poorly, Obama pushed for troop withdrawal early in his 
presidency, most people believed the Iraq government was stable, leading the nation to 
become easily susceptible to outside influences, thus precipitating the rise of ISIS.  
Therefore, the change in the American public’s thinking is easily seen.  The public originally 
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felt success because of how the Iraq government was doing, but after the ISIS invasion, the 
failure of American policy became evident.  The so-called “stable” government was failing, 
and the Iraqi military could barely hold off Islamic fighters.  The fact that the military lost a 
much of the country could be attributed to the withdrawal of the American military, which is 
why 2014 saw a large portion of Americans concluded that a withdrawal from Iraq occurred 
too soon. 
It appears the American people were incredibly eager to withdraw from Iraq, largely 
because the prolong engagement exhausted the public from the Bush to Obama years.  While 
the media and public praised the overall withdrawal efforts initially, no one foresaw the 
gruesome events that eventually would occur, throwing the nation back into a country it 
fought so hard to escape.  Even still, the people largely disapproved of how Obama handled 
the situation, something he appeared to not have changed despite the public pushing for 
reform. 
There was also a similar policy approach with Iran, as both presidents sought to limit 
the country’s nuclear and broader regional power ambitions.  However, as we saw Iran 
proved to generate polling results that countered my hypothesis.  Instead of seeing 
overwhelming support for curbing a foreign adversary’s nuclear progression, we instead find 
a divide within the media and public about the overall effects of the deal.  Many citizens 
believe the deal does not limit Iran’s nuclear growth, which is several media sites echo.   
The media’s coverage fluctuated between the positive and negative because of the 
different issues occurring during the presidency, yet it consistently aired towards the negative 
side.  Obama’s policies were rarely seen in a positive light, the exception being his 
withdrawal policies.  The various stories and specials on Afghanistan and Iraq reinforced the 
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American people’s desires to fully withdraw, as they no longer say any type of reason to 
remain invested in a region that was only wasting American resources and life.  It cannot be 
forgotten that thousands of American soldiers were killed in action carrying out missions for 
the nations, something the American people were exhausted from.  To them, this situation 
mirrored Vietnam: many American casualties, negative results, and little reason for 
continued intervention.   
With this information juxtaposed with the media’s coverage and public opinion data, 
there was once again no real change in policy as a result of the people.  An interesting quote 
to remember from Rachel Maddow is “Does he care about public opinion on this? And if he 
doesn’t, why doesn’t he?” (Pew Research Center 2011), for it represents a difference in 
opinion between the government and the people.  Yes, public opinion is supposed to be 
important for the administration to adhere too because they represent the general public, but 
no, it is not a president’s strict duty to follow it slavishly.  Overall, the media had no effect on 
the presidency as it was believed it would have.  Originally, it was hypothesized President 
Obama would have tweaked some of his policies to maintain greater public support for his 
foreign policy, yet this was not the case.  What largely transpired was mirror image the Bush 
presidency: i.e. a president who made momentous decisions and stuck with his policies in the 
face of public opposition to those policies.  However, the interesting thing to note is how the 
policy actually mirrored the public’s opinion.  Obama did withdraw troops from Afghanistan, 
however this fact was not clearly portrayed within the news media and polling sites.  
Therefore, while we can recognize the Afghanistan policy followed public opinion, it was not 
represented as such. 
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Chapter V: President Trump 
 
This thesis would not be complete without the inclusion of our current president, 
Donald Trump.  Despite having been in office for almost three years, including his current 
policies may enable us to predict what path his policy is taking and whether public opinion 
may or may not ultimately influence it.  Overall, this chapter will find that there is a general 
split between the American people and how they view President Trump’s foreign policy 
actions in the Middle East.  It will be discovered that public opinion changed on several 
policies under the Trump administration, and the media is echoing the public’s thoughts on 
policy. However, despite the brief tenure of the presidency, we could use the information 
gathered and known to predict whether there are likely to be policy changes in the future or 
whether the administration will stick to its current course in response to public opinion. 
 
Policies Initiatives in Middle East 
 
While this section may lack substantial policies, it is only because the President is 
still in the process of making decisions on what to do within the region.  The policies he has 
introduced will be discussed and expanded upon in order to understand the decisions he made 
and if he continued his predecessors’ policies.  All three countries will be raised, as they are 
all extremely prominent in present day.   
 
Afghanistan 
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President Trump’s Afghanistan policy has thus far mirrored that of President Obama: 
both men were staunchly for withdrawing troops, yet they both deployed more military 
members to the country in an attempt to prevent the Taliban from reclaiming the nation.  It 
was believed President Trump had three options when dealing with Afghanistan: full 
withdrawal, increase troops and become a more active member in the political system, and 
have limited counterterrorism engagements (Felbab-Brown 2017).  The decision to leave 
troops in the region, as we have already seen, is unpopular, however it was deemed necessary 
in order to curb Taliban attacks.  The enlarged presence of troops was before any types of 
further developments were discovered, because recently there have been discussions of 
obtaining a peace deal with the Taliban that stated they would not permit any organization to 
carry out a terrorist attack from within Afghanistan as long as the United States withdrew 
their troops (Rohde 2019). 
While increasing the troops in the nation went against the public’s wishes, it appears 
as if President Trump has made headway in terms of striking a peace agreement with the 
Taliban, ending a conflict that has stretched to now almost eighteen years.  Founding a peace 
agreement would accomplish a feat the previous presidents failed to do; however, their prior 
efforts may have aided the long-term process.  Trump’s insertion of additional troops actually 
correlates with the advice and recommendations from his policy advisors.  They told him the 
best way to make peace is to keep up pressure on the Taliban through military presence, 
which encourages it to engage  in diplomatic discussions (Burns 2019; Rohde 2019).  If there 
was a sudden withdrawal of American forces, then the Taliban would have no reason to 
partake in the discussions, which would potentially revert Afghanistan to its form before the 
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American involvement.  Thus far, the policies have been successful, and the talks have been 
continuing fairly well. 
 
Iraq 
 
In his time in office, President Trump only had to deal with one issue with Iraq that 
was slowly waning since his arrival in office: the embeddedness of the Islamic State.  Even 
in his campaign speeches, the President promised the American people that he would defeat 
ISIS at all costs.  Ultimately, it led to policies that did not deviate much from the previous 
administration.  Even though he ran stating he did not support the Iraq War, he did not intend 
on withdrawing from the nation without having defeated the terrorist organization (Smith 
2018).  Iraq has largely claimed they defeated ISIS in 2018, but that has not stemmed the 
latter’s attacks on the Iraqi people (Damon et al. 2019).  These attacks are some of the 
motivators behind the continued troop placement.  In neighboring Syria, it was reported that 
ISIS was defeated in March 2019, causing happiness in the region (Benen 2019; Galioto 
2019; Mitchell 2019; Rogers and Hubbard 2019).  This announcement is crucial because it is 
also at a moment where, as mentioned above, the situation in Afghanistan is also amidst 
reaching peace.  After years of conflict, there is a possibility that both wars could end within 
the same year. 
However, the Iraq War ceasing does not necessarily mean all military action will 
cease.  President Trump may soon create a policy that would keep troops in Iraq in order to 
monitor Iran, one of the President’s greatest enemies (Arraf 2019; Hanna and Cambanis 
2019).  While this proposition would cause many problems, largely because Iraq wants the 
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United States to completely withdraw, it is currently unsure whether this will become a 
policy that survives the duration of the presidency.  President Trump does not trust the 
Iranian government and believes maintaining a robust military presence near its border will 
allow better insight into preventing the nation from obtaining a nuclear weapon.  The major 
issue that underlies this policy is the fact that there would be a continued military presence in 
a nation that is largely against the American insertion.  Only time will determine what will 
happen. 
 
Iran 
 
President Trump has been very vocal about the types of policies he has intended to 
implement regarding Iran.  Since the creation of the Iran Deal in 2015, Trump has been firm 
in stating how the deal did not fully benefit the United States and also did not adequately 
limit Iran’s ability to acquire nuclear weapons.  Thus, one of the first decisions he made was 
to pursue a policy course that took a harder stance on Iran’s nuclear development.  The first 
step in this process was withdrawing from the 2015 deal, thus sparking concerns from 
European allies but support from Middle Eastern allies, which was viewed as one-sided and 
not capable of reaching any type of peace (Landler 2018).  The next few steps are still in 
progress, as the withdrawal from the 2015 deal only happened in May 2018.  However, on 
the basis of the President’s rhetoric, it is expected he will pursue hardline policies that are 
designed to ensure Iran does not obtain nuclear weapons. 
Aside from the withdrawal, there have been economic sanctions imposed on Iran that 
are intended to cripple its government and bring it closer to negotiations for a new deal. 
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However, the Iranian foreign ministry correspondent acknowledged those sanctions would 
further divide the two nations, causing more animosity between representatives (P. Stewart 
2018).  The US administration may have also been hoping their economic sanction policies 
would encourage the Iranian people to rise up and call for reform in the nuclear industry, 
however that has also failed to occur.  Presently, one of the newest biggest issues was 
mentioned above, American troops in Iraq to monitor Iran, as it now appears no type of deal 
could be achieved without the overall supervision of the American government.  As these 
events are still occurring and unfolding, it will be interesting to see how these chains of 
events aid or deter a new nuclear deal. 
 
Media Coverage 
 
It may not be a wrong to speculate that most people would agree that President 
Trump has received a lot of bad press concerning many of his actions since he started 
campaigning for the presidency.  However, it is important to understand that much of this 
negativity may be the result of his heated rhetoric and explanation of the policies compared 
to an actual examination and implication of them.  This negativity would demonstrate a bias 
media, which could affect the public in several ways.  It could demonstrate the media could 
want their own agenda passed or echo the feelings the American people have towards the 
president and not the policy. 
 
Afghanistan 
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President Trump has been campaigning for a withdrawal in Afghanistan since his run 
for the presidency in 2015.  However, we learned since his time in office that he has 
deployed more troops in 2017, doing what President Obama did only a few years earlier.  
While the media has been touting reports of the public wanting an American withdrawal, it is 
come to be shown that after Trump made headway with the Taliban’s leaders, which could 
lead to a peace deal and an actual withdrawal and end of military conflict after 18 years, the 
media is now unsure about pulling out of Afghanistan.  Some news media, like The New 
Yorker, have published articles that praise the withdrawal as means of moving on from the 
past, yet others, for example The Washington Post, show a new type of apprehension in 
withdrawing (Olsen 2019; Rohde 2019).  Another news source, The New York Times, is 
conflicted, as some of their reporters state the importance of withdrawing from Afghanistan 
and others state Trump may be acting to rashly to withdraw right away (Olsen 2019; Finer 
and Malley 2019).  There are some television outlets, such as NBC News, that merely stated 
defeat should be declared, hinting withdrawal is the right policy to pursue (Andelman 2018).  
Overall, the media is still divided, and the fluctuation of opinion among outlets is concerning.  
Seeing a general divide in the media at this point could be a demonstration of biases based on 
who the president is compared to the policies he creates.  Instead of examining and critiquing 
the policies Trump institutes, coverage could be changing because of how they view him as a 
person. 
 
Iraq 
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Much of the media reporting on ISIS does not come from Iraq, largely because of 
claims ISIS’s strongholds were defeated in 2018 (Damon et al. 2019), but rather Syria, where 
the group was supposedly defeated in March 2019.  However, the issue of a potential 
resurgence arises, which one source attributes to how Iraq government is currently operating 
(Damon et al. 2019).  While its coverage of ISIS in Iraq since their original defeat has 
tapered off, much of the media’s focus have been on the new developments of keeping 
military troops on base to watch Iran. 
The sources largely agree that Trump’s new policy of maintaining troops in Iraq just 
for to contain Iran is foolhardy and should not be considered (Hanna and Cambanis 2019; 
Hansler 2019).  Other sources are choosing to focus on the Iraq side of the issue rather than 
the American side because of the overall effect it would have on the people: a prolong United 
States presence in their country.  The Iraqi people do not want to be a part of the American 
conflict with Iran, as it would cause the nation to have their own issues with their neighbor.  
Iraq is attempting to rebuild relationships, and having this strain would tamper it (Burke 
2019; Rubin and Schmitt 2019; Turak 2019).  These sources are therefore fairly critical of 
this policy because of the strain it would place on the Iraqi people.  Through their continued 
coverage on the effects it has on Iraq and issues it could cause, it could theoretically cause 
the American people to oppose this policy. 
 
Iran 
 
In the last chapter it was discovered a vast split within the media’s coverage of 
Obama’s Iran deal.  In this new presidency, the media has demonstrated unease and concern 
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at the start of the withdrawal, yet over time has reached a conclusion that withdrawing from 
the deal was highly beneficial (Fleitz 2019; Stanley 2018; Stephens 2019).  Following two 
nations that had the media split on Trump’s policy, the overall agreement that the United 
States should withdraw and create a new deal is very surprising.  These sources also discuss 
how Iran has continued breaching the deal through its further pursuit of nuclear weapons, 
how the United States has not fully inspected Iran for enriched uranium plants, and how the 
new sanctions imposed since that time have harmed Iranian economic growth, showing 
success of withdrawing from deal (Fleitz 2019; Stanley 2018; Stephens 2019).  The portrayal 
of success is encouraging to the American people that President Trump may be creating a 
good policy that could better protect their interests.  While the articles are not clearly 
supporting this action, their portrayal of a successful policy may, in time, lead the American 
people to support withdrawing from the Iran deal, despite it being one of President Obama’s 
foreign policy achievements. 
 
Public Opinion 
 
At this time, it can be noticed that the much of the media has exhibited bias toward 
many of the President’s policies in the three nations.  However, the extent of this bias’s effect 
on the public has yet to be addressed.  Therefore, this section seeks to understand if there are 
any current trends with regard to how the public has reacted to the media’s take on the 
policies and if they responded openly to the government in either support or opposition.7  
                                                        
7 Also, based on what we see on the news and words we hear around us, it is important to make sure the polls 
used differentiate between people’s opinions of the President and their opinions of the policy.  Currently, I have 
come across many people that dislike the policies the President has introduced because he is the one who 
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Based on policy changes thus far, it is theorized that the President may experience more 
public support than the previous administrations because his actions are reflecting the 
preferences of the American people.8  While this trend is ideal, we must also be prepared to 
anticipate results that demonstrate a continued split between support and opposition.  
Political biases have increased since the 2016 election.9 
 
Afghanistan 
 
[Insert Figure 5.01] 
 
As we saw in polling data from the previous chapter, and again in Figure 5.01, 2018 
saw 49% of Americans believed the United States government “mostly failed” in 
Afghanistan (Oliphant 2018b).  This poll would lead us to assume that a large majority of 
Americans would prefer some type of withdrawal.  However, surprisingly between 41 and 
51% of Americans approve of withdrawing in Afghanistan, yet 57% would support an 
immediate withdrawal of troops (Kirby 2019; Ruger 2018).  The authorization of the use of 
military force has still remained unpopular among Americans, yet they remain split among 
the means of actual withdrawal, which will be discussed further in the concluding section of 
this chapter. 
 
                                                        
formed it.  This discrepancy should be noted, and proper reading and analysis of the polls will be conducted to 
guarantee this effect does not occur. 
8 It must also be noted that there will be no variable for whether or not people answered based on their 
impression of Trump.  That is why the polling data will be chosen carefully. 
9 This point to be discussed further in the concluding chapter. 
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Iraq 
 
[Insert Figure 5.02] 
 
The survey data on Iraq largely reflect the predominant views among the American 
people about the conflict in Afghanistan.  Figure 5.02 demonstrates the same view we have 
seen in the previous chapters, yet it still holds true.  There was one poll that had information 
on how the American public felt about withdrawing from Iraq, but it was included in their 
thoughts on withdrawing from Afghanistan.  This poll found that 25% of Americans wanted 
troops to be withdrawn from both Iraq and Afghanistan and  25% wanted a decrease in troop 
levels (Ruger n.d.).  Once again, and similar to Afghanistan polling information, we are 
struck with data that does not necessarily agree with the discoveries we made earlier.  
Another poll that speaks to the concern of data not lining up comes from Figure 5.03, which 
shows that, as of 2019, 79 % of Americans view Iraq as unfavorable, which makes a case for 
theorizing a similar percentage would want more of a troop decrease.  However, it appears 
that this may not be true. 
 
[Insert Figure 5.03] 
 
With regard to American opinion on troops remaining for watching Iran, no polls 
have been released. 
 
Iran 
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Iran has seen a discrepancy between two important sites that discuss support and 
opposition for the 2015 Iran nuclear deal.  The Pew Research Center and The Hill polled 
Americans about the deal, with Pew finding 32% support the deal and 40% oppose it, 
whereas The Hill found the opposite: 56% supported Obama’s deal to 26% (Folley 2018; 
Pew Research Center 2018).  This disjuncture in outcomes may demonstrate that the public is 
fully split between whether or not they support the original deal.  A separate reason we find a 
disjuncture may be resulted from the format at in which the polling sites asked their 
questions.  Question format is important in polls, and certain styles may cause respondents to 
choose one answer over another (Pew Research Center n.d.).  Moving forward, three 
different polling sites, Reuters, CNN, and CBS, all have different figures on the percentage 
of respondents that prefer to stay in the Iran nuclear deal President Trump threatened to 
withdraw from.  Reuters found 42% of Americans wanted to remain in the deal, CNN found 
63%, and CBS found 21%.  However, they all similarly found nearly the same percentages in 
American citizens that support withdrawal, 29%, 24%, and 21% respectively (De Pinto et al. 
2018; Kahn 2018; Sparks 2018).  The support for withdrawal is the only the constant, and the 
massive gaps between the opposition also demonstrates how torn the American people 
actually are in terms of discussing this issue. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Based on the information gathered from the media portrayals of Trump’s policies and 
public opinion polls related to his policies, we find very strange trends that ultimately need 
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more time to sort out.  Much of the disjuncture described above is a result of how the media 
and public opinion have changed from the previous presidencies to the current 
administration.  The media has been torn between whether or not the United States should 
not withdraw from Afghanistan even though the sitting president is determined to do so and 
has been the only President to make real progress towards it.  We have learned he has taken 
steps towards negotiating with the Taliban to ensure the safety of the United States will be 
retained and Afghanistan will no longer harbor terroristic organizations.  However, based on 
what we find in the polls, there is a bare majority of citizens that actually wants to follow 
through with a withdrawal despite the high percentage stating the United States failed in their 
mission.  Thus, what we find with Afghanistan is that while Americans largely favor 
withdrawal, they are split between how the withdrawal should be conducted, and when it 
should occur. 
Iraq also poses a similar situation. However, we have slightly more information that 
allows us to narrow down our theories.  As seen from the data, the media largely focused on 
the Iraqi side of the American military remaining to watch Iran, with minor information 
about ISIS’s presence that still remains since announcement of their defeat in 2017.  
However, as there is still a large presence of troops, we know from the previous chapters that 
American citizens want out of the elongated military action, and once again President Trump 
is the only president willing to fully withdraw.  Even still, we only see barely half of 
Americans that actually want to go through with withdrawal despite the large amount that 
view Iraq as unfavorable.  One possible answer to this is the puzzle is that the American 
people are hesitant on a full withdrawal from Iraq because they are wary of the nation.  There 
have been two deployments of troops within two administrations, which may lead to fear of 
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Iraq potentially succumbing to another terroristic government, thrusting the United States 
into yet another military action.  However, time will determine whether or not this scenario 
occurs.  As for keeping troops within Iraq to check Iran, as there is no data it is hard to make 
assumptions on what the public believes. 
Lastly, Iran raises the biggest puzzle because of all the discrepancies discovered 
during the research.  The polling data also does not match what the media message projects.  
As we saw in the last chapter, the media was divided towards the Iran nuclear deal, and 
Trump received a lot of support for the withdrawal and pursuit of a new policy.  However, 
the data does not support this conclusion.  Based on the current information, we can assume 
that the public is very divided about whether it supports a policy of withdrawing from Iran.  
There is one conclusion that can be deduced from the information, and that is the American 
people were hesitant to withdraw from the Iran deal because it provided some assurance that 
a deal was in place as means of security in knowing Iran had some stipulations on enriching 
their uranium, even if it was unsteady and unenforced.  Now, there is nothing is in place 
aside from sanctions that limit Iran’s economic growth. 
Thus, the overall conclusion is that while the media varied in terms of portraying the 
news to instilling bias within the American people, there is no evidence that would support 
the media’s effect how the public should respond to President Trump’s foreign policy.  Also, 
it was found that the American people largely formulated opinions that were contrary to what 
the media was projecting.  These discrepancies show a divide within the public and how it is 
not relying on the media as a source of opinion during the current presidency.  Trump’s 
presidency is still in its early stages, and his policies are evolving and emerging as this thesis 
is being written.  There will be more information available later, but at this time the findings 
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stand.  A lack of polling data is a result of lack of present information, because it takes time 
for institutions to poll and gather their information before distributing it.  Therefore, the 
information available at this time demonstrates the public is torn regarding its views about 
the president’s foreign policy.  
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Chapter VI: Conclusion 
 
This thesis has provided information on the media coverage and public opinion 
related to the foreign policies of Presidents Bush, Obama, and Trump in order to understand 
the underlying relationship between the policy, the media, and public opinion.  President 
Bush’s policies were favorably received by the public from the beginning of his presidency 
because of its support for fighting terrorism after the 9/11 attacks.  However, the longevity of 
the military campaign in Afghanistan and Iraq caused public opinion to reverse course and 
prefer American troops be withdrawn.  While information on Iran was scant, it was assumed 
that the public largely supported the attempts to stem the nation’s nuclear pursuit.  However, 
the overall transition from positive to negative, with a majority of the administration 
experiencing positive remarks, leads to the conclusion that much of Bush’s policy was 
perceived positively and had the backing of the American public public preferences.  
Although, as demonstrated in the Bush chapter, there was a change in opinion during his 
administration in which Bush did not heed, which is why we arrive at the conclusion that 
public opinion did not influence Bush’s policy.  
President Obama’s policies were also perceived positively by the public at the start, 
but they then proceeded to receive more negative press after the President deployed more 
troops to Afghanistan and failed to withdraw them in a timely manner.  His Iraq policy also 
received some negative press due to the rise in ISIS, thus causing unfavorable opinions from 
the public towards the policies designed to defeat them.  In some cases, the people wanted 
more robust action taken, yet this was not done.  Iran slowly increased their nuclear power, 
but after the nuclear deal it was unsure whether the media and people would support it.  
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There was no clear evidence on whether the public fully supported or fully opposed the deal 
when it was formed, and we have only begun to learn about some of the issues the public was 
concerned with during the Trump administration.  In general, public opinion did not affect 
Obama’s foreign policy, and the media’s role was one that largely echoed the public’s 
preferences. 
Lastly, President Trump, while still early in his presidency, found that his foreign 
policies actually reflected public opinion to a greater extent than was true during the previous 
administrations, yet it then changed course in favor of not wanting a full or quick withdrawal, 
but rather one that was long and extended over time.  The same was true of public opinion 
concerning the Iran nuclear deal.  After the President announced he would pull out from the 
deal, the public, which originally had trended not liking the deal, was split on whether the 
United States should be part of the deal.  The media has also wavered between good and bad 
press, which mirrored public opinion.  Thus, we found President Trump created policy that 
initially agreed with public opinion as it appeared under Bush and Obama.  However, the 
popular opinions in the previous administration are not popular in Trump’s, which is why he 
is technically not adhering to public opinion.  The news media echoes the different views 
Americans have on his policies. 
At this point, we must now consider what these presidents have in common in order 
to fully answer our question.  As we found with all three presidents, public opinion did not 
affect any of their policy choices.  The media, however, was only slightly more split.  
President Bush found the media served as a means of supporting foreign policy, but President 
Obama and President Trump found the media echoed the opinions of the American public, 
leading us to understand they are seen as attempting to aid the public in influencing the 
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foreign policy.  Therefore, since the most recent presidencies find more media involvement 
in influencing policy, the overall result is that public opinion does not affect foreign policy 
making in the Middle East, and the media is beginning to side with the public in its attempts 
to change policy to follow their opinions.  This result was not expected and creates a new 
hypothesis, as the results did not support any of my previous ones.  Ultimately, this new 
hypothesis leads to more puzzles and the need for further research. 
One puzzle that must be addressed is the new relationship that has formed with the 
media and public during the Obama administration that has since continued into the Trump 
presidency.  The media turned from merely reporting the news to taking a stance with the 
public that takes of the form of two versus one in creating foreign policy.  The puzzle is why 
this new dynamic took root, and what caused it.  There are several theories that could account 
for this change, such as the media thinking the public’s demands are heard but not met, the 
media wanting more representation of public opinion incorporated in foreign policy, or the 
media upholding the values of a democracy and giving the public a greater voice.  This 
puzzle is one that should address in future research. 
A question that arises is the discourse in public reactions towards Trump’s policies.  
While he did deploy more troops to Afghanistan towards the beginning of his presidency, he 
has since then followed public demands to withdraw them after getting close to forging a 
peace deal with the Taliban.  However, as we found in his chapter, the public then switched 
their opinions regarding the question of whether actually wanted the troops to be withdrawn 
and/or if the withdrawal should be prolonged.  One idea as to why this occurred could be 
because of how the general public views the president as a person.  Based on my personal 
observation, there are many people who find it hard to objectively assess the policies Trump 
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enacts and thus view all of his policies unfavorably because they dislike him as a person.  
There has been a large percentage of the American public that views Trump as personally 
mean, cruel, and unfair and, as a consequence, see the same about his policies.  If people 
cannot take policy seriously because they are unable to take the president seriously, a new 
dynamic is taking shape with the American public, and more research should be conducted 
on why people think this and what it could mean for future presidents. 
Another question that falls out of the Trump chapter is whether public opinion 
actually influences foreign policy.  As we have seen, public opinion did not influence 
policies, but this new question only arises when we see a shift into how the public changed 
their views once President Trump crafted his policies on troop withdrawal.  The public held a 
firm stance in wanting withdrawal during the Bush and Obama administrations, but when 
Trump introduced it public sentiment shifted drastically.  If this quick change, after a long 
period of uniformity of sentiment occurred “randomly”, then why would the public’s 
preferences be incorporated into policy?  For future presidents, this random shift of opinion 
may create uncertainty about what the public actually desires, thus promoting the idea not to 
consider them when formulating and implementing policy. 
Overall, we learn that our findings are fairly diverse and conform with the literature 
discussed in the Introduction.  The current relationship between public opinion and foreign 
policy could be added to the Almond-Lippmann consensus theory that public opinion has 
little effect on foreign policy.  We discovered there was no effect of opinion on any of the 
policies, which is why their theories hold up.  There was also another piece of evidence that 
supported the Almond-Lippmann consensus, the change in public opinion under the Trump 
administration.  Because of the drastic switch, we can assume that public opinion is, in their 
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words, “volatile,” leading to public to make irrational decisions on whether to support or 
oppose policy.  The public, not acting as rational actors, is then at risk of preferring 
wrongheaded or suboptimal policies.  However, this thesis adds to the question of 
understanding the type of impact the media may have in promoting public opinion.  The 
public was known to have received much of its information from the press, and the press has 
slowly evolved into transmitting its opinions to the government.  Thus, we find that the 
media is trying to impact foreign policy through the transmission of information about public 
opinion.  However, this theory still needs time to develop, because impact is not 
instantaneous.  
The final topic to address in this conclusion is the impact of partisanship on foreign 
policy.  The issue of partisanship in the United States has seem to have risen in recent years, 
which is why it is important in the discussion of whether or not people support foreign 
policy.  In previous research, there were two hypotheses as to why people supported foreign 
policy, either (1) “people’s support for foreign policy reflects individuals underlying 
interests, values, and ideologies,” or (2) “people’s support for foreign policy reflects 
individuals’ partisanship” (Mayer 2018, 1).  This study was also conducted with presidents 
Bush, Obama, and Trump, but used the countries Russia, China, and North Korea as case 
studies because they are considered high-profile nations in foreign policy.  Overall, the first 
hypothesis was supported, with a change beginning between 2016 and 2017.  This 
information correlates with this study, as we see the same trends with both parties on most 
policies.  Therefore, partisanship also does not really have an effect on foreign policy, as 
American citizens as a whole want to see what is best for the nation, not their party. 
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The Middle Eastern region is a high-profile area that receives a lot of attention in the 
news media.  American citizens constantly hear about recent events, whether a bombing, 
resurgence of a terrorist group, or claim that a nation has overthrown its government.  We 
also hear a lot on what the American government is doing in the region as well.  Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and Iran are three of the most prominent nations with which the United States interacts, 
for most of the current policy includes one or more of those countries.  Therefore, with the 
issue of salience, the results of this thesis could be expanded upon and potentially find other 
high-profile nations receive similar news coverage and policies.  Previous research found 
similar results in partisanship in the Middle East from Russia, China, and North Korea, 
making it plausible similar results on the American public at large could be found Russia, 
China, and North Korea.  The American people have tended to be fairly consistent in their 
preferences regarding policy until the most recent administration.  The same effect occurred 
in prior research also containing high-profile nations.  This finding leads me to believe and 
predict that public opinion does not affect any type of foreign policy towards a high-profile 
nation or region, and consequently, a low-profile nation or region. 
This research was very surprising in several ways.  First, the results were completely 
unexpected.  As mentioned previously, it was theorized that public opinion would have some 
type influence in determining the course of foreign policies that were pursued in the Middle 
East.  This was not the case.  It was also assumed the President Obama would have tailored 
his policies to the preferences of the public.  Even though he did, the public did not recognize 
it.  Lastly, it was assumed President Trump would not adhere to the public and instead pursue 
policies he thought best.  Ultimately, he was the only president who reflected public 
sentiment, they just happened to have a change in opinion.  Public opinion on certain matters 
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are heard, yet not acted upon.  When they are acted upon, opinion can change.  These results 
are puzzling yet cannot be answered until more time has passed.  Whatever occurs will prove 
interesting, because we are still expanding upon the relationship behind the media, public, 
and government.  While this change may be a fluke in the relationship, it could very well 
reshape how we view foreign policy and whether or not public opinion truly has no say in 
decisions designed to help them. 
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Figure 2.01 courtesy of (Saad 2016) 
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Figure 2.02 courtesy of (Saad 2016) 
 
Figure 2.03 
 
Figure 2.03 courtesy of (Allen, Samaranayake, and Albrittain Jr. 2007) 
 
Figure 2.04 
 
Figure 2.04 courtesy of (Mueller 1971) 
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Figure 3.01 
 U.S. MILITARY ATTACKS AGAINST AFGHANISTAN 
(OCTOBER 2001) 
 All Reps Dems Inds 
Approve 90% 97% 85% 87% 
Disapprove 6% 1% 10% 6% 
Don't Know 4% 2% 5% 7% 
As seen in (De Pinto 2009) 
 
Figure 3.02 
 IS THE U.S. DOING THE RIGHT THING BY 
FIGHTING THE WAR IN AFGHANISTAN? (NOW) 
 All Reps Dems Inds 
Yes 47% 67% 36% 45% 
No 42% 25% 55% 41% 
Don't Know 11% 8% 9% 14% 
*Now occurred between September 19 and 23, 2009, as seen in (De Pinto 2009) 
 
Figure 3.03 
 
As seen in (Newport 2014) 
 
Figure 3.04 
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As seen in (Langer 2009). 
 
Figure 3.05 
 
As seen in (Editors of Pew Research Center 2008) 
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Figure 3.06 
 
As seen in (Editors of Pew Research Center 2008) 
 
Figure 3.07 
 
Data collected from (Gallup Inc n.d.) 
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Figure 3.08 
Was the Iraq War Worth the Costs? 
  Worth It Not Worth It 
Aug-03 46% 45% 
Mar-08 28% 66% 
Data taken from (Dutton et al. 2014) 
 
Figure 3.09 
 
Data collected from (Gallup Inc n.d.) 
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As seen in (Oliphant 2018b) 
 
Figure 4.02 
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As seen in (Saad 2011) 
 
Figure 4.03 
 
As seen in (Saad 2011) 
 
Figure 4.04 
 
As seen in (Gallup Inc n.d.) 
 
Figure 4.05 
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As seen in (Dugan 2014) 
 
Figure 4.06 
 
As seen in (Drake 2014) 
 
Figure 4.07 
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As seen in (Gallup Inc n.d.) 
 
Figure 4.08 
 
As seen in (McCarthy 2017) 
 
Figure 4.09 
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As seen in (Pew Research Center 2015). 
 
 
Figure 5.01 
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As seen in (Oliphant 2018b). 
 
Figure 5.02 
 
As seen in (Oliphant 2018a) 
 
Figure 5.03 
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As seen in (Gallup Inc n.d.) 
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